Climate Change, Spring/Summer 2007, Issue 16 by unknown

In Memory of
Dr. Jeff Jack, Director of the KIESD Center for
Environmental Science, was tragically killed in an
automobile accident January 1, 2007. Jeff was a
tenured faculty member in the Department of
Biology since 1998 and was named the Tom
Wallace Chair in Conservation Biology in 2006.
His work in micro- and macro-zooplankton, stream
restoration, and large river ecology was recognized
nationally. His expertise was highly regarded and
he was frequently sought to work on water quality
issues statewide. Masters and doctoral students
interested in water quality issues selected him to
be their advisor. He supervised 22 Masters and
PhD students. Jeff understood the value of
interdisciplinary research and collaborated with
faculty from across campus.
He leaves a family of two girls, Amanda and
Gracelyn, and his wife Elaine.
Jeff Jack
1963 – 2007
 2 The Threat to the Planet Jim Hansen
9 The Geopolitics of Global Climate Change Rodger A. Payne
16 Rising Temperatures, Rising Stakes:Global Warming In the Courts Amy Royden-Bloom
24 Greenhouse Gas Registries in the United States:Cutting through the Clutter Ryan Levinson,
Pankaj Bhatia,
and Jonathan Pershing
29 The Role of Glaciers and Ice Cores inDeciphering Global Climate Change Keith R. Mountain
35 The Response of Glaciers to Climate Change:The Example of Mt. Kilimanjaro, East Africa Keith R. Mountain
43 Agreement Reached by Seven Northeastern States
to Address Global Warming: The Regional
Greenhouse Gas Inititiative Chris James
45 State Climate Policy Planning:Once Again, Leading by Example Kenneth A. Colburn
51 A Climate of Hope: How American Cities areChanging the Debate on Climate Change Greg Nickels
52 Local Momentum Brings a Wave of Change: Meeting the Threat of Global
Climate Change Head-on Dennis J. McLerran
55 Louisville Metro: Addressing Local Opportunities
and Obligations to Address
Global Climate Change Arthur L. Williams
Cover:  An ice core is recovered from the summit of the
Dunde Ice Cap on the Tibetan Plateau in western China.
Keith Mountain (right) and colleague Bruce Koci operate the
drill on the 18,000 foot summit. The ice core was returned to
the Byrd Polar Research Center at the Ohio State University
for analysis and yielded a 15,000 year climate record for the
northern Tibetan Plateau.
The University of Louisville is an equal opportunity institution and does not discriminate against persons on the basis of age, religion, sex,disabili-
















Design & Printing Services
The Kentucky Institute for the Environment and
Sustainable Development (KIESD) was created in
July 1992 within the Office of the
Vice President for Research,
University of Louisville.
The Institute provides a forum to conduct interdis-
ciplinary research, applied scholarly analysis, pub-
lic service and educational outreach on environ-
mental and sustainable development issues at the
local, state, national
and international levels.
KIESD is comprised of eight  thematic program
centers: Environmental Education, Environmental
Science, Environmental Law, Sustainable Urban
Neighborhoods, Pollution Prevention,
Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences,
Environmental Policy and Management, and
Environmental Engineering.
Sustain is published semi- annually by the





Send electronic correspondence to
r.barnett@louisville.edu
This Publication is printed
on recycled paper.
Issue 16      Spring/Summer 2007
 
Spring/Summer 20072
Animals are on the run. Plants are migrating too. The
Earth’s creatures, save for one species, do not have ther-
mostats in their living rooms that they can adjust for an
optimum environment. Animals and plants are adapted to spe-
cific climate zones, and they can survive only when they are in
those zones. Indeed, scientists often define climate zones by the
vegetation and animal life that they support. Gardeners and
bird watchers are well aware of this, and their handbooks con-
tain maps of the zones in which a tree or flower can survive and
the range of each bird species.
Those maps will have to be
redrawn. Most people, mainly aware of
larger day-to-day fluctuations in the
weather, barely notice that climate, the
average weather, is changing. In the
1980s I started to use colored dice that I
hoped would help people understand
global warming at an early stage. Of the
six sides of the dice only two sides were
red, or hot, representing the probability
of having an unusually warm season dur-
ing the years between 1951 and 1980.
By the first decade of the twenty-first
century, four sides were red. Just such an
increase in the frequency of unusually
warm seasons, in fact, has occurred. But
most people —who have other things on
their minds and can use thermostats—
have taken little notice.
Animals have no choice, since their
survival is at stake. Recently after appearing on television to
discuss climate change, I received an e-mail from a man in
northeast Arkansas: “I enjoyed your report on Sixty Minutes
and commend your strength. I would like to tell you of an
observation I have made. It is the armadillo. I had not seen one
of these animals my entire life, until the last ten years. I drive
the same forty-mile trip on the same road every day and have
slowly watched these critters advance further north every year
and they are not stopping. Every year they move several
miles.”
Armadillos appear to be pretty tough. Their mobility sug-
gests that they have a good chance to keep up with the move-
ment of their climate zone, and to be one of the surviving
species. Of course, as they reach the city limits of St. Louis and
Chicago, they may not be welcome. And their ingenuity may be
taxed as they seek ways to ford rivers and multiple-lane high-
ways.
Problems are greater for other species, as Tim Flannery, a
well-known Australian mammalogist and conservationist,
makes clear in The Weather Makers. Ecosystems are based on
interdependencies—between, for example, flower and pollina-
tor, hunter and hunted, grazers and plant life—so the less
mobile species have an impact on the survival of others. Of
course climate fluctuated in the past, yet
species adapted and flourished. But now
the rate of climate change driven by
human activity is reaching a level that
dwarfs natural rates of change. And barri-
ers created by human beings, such as
urban sprawl and homogeneous agricul-
tural fields, block many migration routes.
If climate change is too great, natural bar-
riers, such as coastlines, spell doom for
some species.
Studies of more than one thousand
species of plants, animals, and insects,
including butterfly ranges charted by
members of the public, found an average
migration rate toward the North and
South Poles of about four miles per
decade in the second half of the twentieth
century. That is not fast enough. During
the past thirty years the lines marking the
regions in which a given average temper-
ature prevails (“isotherms”) have been moving poleward at a
rate of about thirty-five miles per decade. That is the size of a
county in Iowa. Each decade the range of a given species is
moving one row of counties northward.
As long as the total movement of isotherms toward the poles
is much smaller than the size of the habitat, or the ranges in
which the animals live, the effect on species is limited. But now
the movement is inexorably toward the poles and totals more
than a hundred miles over the past several decades. If emissions
of greenhouse gases continue to increase at the current rate—
”business as usual”—then the rate of isotherm movement will
double in this century to at least seventy miles per decade. If we
continue on this path, a large fraction of the species on Earth, as
many as 50 percent or more, may become extinct.
The Threat to the Planet
By Jim Hansen
Goddard Space Institute
National Aeronatic and Space Administration
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The species most at risk are those in
polar climates and the biologically diverse
slopes of alpine regions. Polar animals, in
effect, will be pushed off the planet.
Alpine species will be pushed toward
higher altitudes, and toward smaller, rock-
ier areas with thinner air; thus, in effect,
they will also be pushed off the planet. A
few such species, such as polar bears, no
doubt will be “rescued” by human beings,
but survival in zoos or managed animal
reserves will be small consolation to bears
or nature lovers.
In the Earth’s history, during periods
when average global temperatures
increased by as much as ten degrees
Fahrenheit, there have been several “mass
extinctions,” when between 50 and 90
percent of the species on Earth disap-
peared forever. In each case, life survived
and new species developed over hundreds
of thousands of years. The most recent of
these mass extinctions defines the bound-
ary, 55 million years ago, between the
Paleocene and Eocene epochs. The evolu-
tionary turmoil associated with that cli-
mate change gave rise to a host of modern
mammals, from rodents to primates,
which appear in fossil records for the first
time in the early Eocene.
If human beings follow a business-
as-usual course, continuing to exploit fos-
sil fuel resources without reducing carbon
emissions or capturing and sequestering
them before they warm the atmosphere,
the eventual effects on climate and life
may be comparable to those at the time of
mass extinctions. Life will survive, but it
will do so on a transformed planet. For all
foreseeable human generations, it will be
a far more desolate world than the one in
which civilization developed and flour-
ished during the past several thousand
years.
The greatest threat of climate
change for human beings, I
believe, lies in the potential desta-
bilization of the massive ice sheets in
Greenland and Antarctica. As with the
extinction of species, the disintegration of
ice sheets is irreversible for practical pur-
poses. Our children, grandchildren, and
many more generations will bear the con-
sequences of choices that we make in the
next few years.
The level of the sea throughout the
globe is a reflection primarily of changes
in the volume of ice sheets and thus of
changes of global temperature. When the
planet cools, ice sheets grow on conti-
nents and the sea level falls. Conversely,
when the Earth warms, ice melts and the
sea level rises. In Field Notes from a
Catastrophe, Elizabeth Kolbert reports on
the work of researchers trying to under-
stand the acceleration of melting, and in
his new book and film An Inconvenient
Truth, Al Gore graphically illustrates pos-
sible effects of a rising sea level on
Florida and other locations.
Ice sheets waxed and waned as the
Earth cooled and warmed over the past
500,000 years. During the coldest ice
ages, the Earth’s average temperature was
about ten degrees Fahrenheit colder than
today. So much water was locked in the
largest ice sheet, more than a mile thick
and covering most of Canada and north-
ern parts of the United States, that the sea
level was 400 feet lower than today. The
warmest interglacial periods were about
two degrees Fahrenheit warmer than
today and the sea level was as much as
sixteen feet higher.
Future rise in the sea level will
depend, dramatically, on the increase in
greenhouse gases, which will largely
determine the amount of global warming.
As described in the books under review,
sunlight enters the atmosphere and warms
the Earth, and then is sent back into space
as heat radiation. Greenhouse gases trap
this heat in the atmosphere and thereby
warm the Earth’s surface as we are
warmed when blankets are piled on our
bed. Carbon dioxide (CO2), produced
mainly by burning fossil fuels (coal, oil,
and gas), is the most important green-
house gas made by human beings.
Methane (CH4), which is “natural gas”
that escapes to the atmosphere from coal
mines, oil wells, rice paddies, landfills,
and animal feedlots, is also an important
greenhouse gas. Other significant warm-
ing agents are ground-level ozone and
black soot, which arise mainly from
incomplete combustion of fossil fuels and
biofuels.
In order to arrive at an effective poli-
cy we can project two different scenarios
concerning climate change. In the busi-
ness-as-usual scenario, annual emissions
of CO2 continue to increase at the current
rate for at least fifty years, as do non-CO2
warming agents including methane,
ozone, and black soot. In the alternative
scenario, CO2 emissions level off this
decade, slowly decline for a few decades,
and by mid-century decrease rapidly,
aided by new technologies.
The business-as-usual scenario yields
an increase of about five degrees
Fahrenheit of global warming during this
century, while the alternative scenario
yields an increase of less than two degrees
Fahrenheit during the same period.
Warming can be predicted accurately
based on knowledge of how Earth
responded to similar levels of greenhouse
gases in the past. (By drilling into glaciers
to analyze air bubbles trapped under lay-
ers of snow, scientists can measure the
levels of each gas in the atmosphere hun-
dreds of thousands of years ago. By com-
paring the concentrations of different iso-
topes of oxygen in these air bubbles, they
can measure the average temperature of
past centuries.) Climate models by them-
selves yield similar answers. However,
the evidence from the Earth’s history pro-
vides a more precise and sensitive meas-
ure, and we know that the real world accu-
rately included the effects of all feedback
processes, such as changes of clouds and
water vapor, that have an effect on tem-
perature.
How much will sea level rise with
five degrees of global warming? Here too,
our best information comes from the
Earth’s history. The last time that the
2.
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Earth was five degrees warmer was three
million years ago, when sea level was
about eighty feet higher.
Eighty feet! In that case, the United
States would lose most East Coast cities:
Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
Washington, and Miami; indeed, practi-
cally the entire state of Florida would be
under water. Fifty million people in the
US live below that sea level. Other places
would fare worse. China would have 250
million displaced persons. Bangladesh
would produce 120 million refugees,
practically the entire nation. India would
lose the land of 150 million people.
A rise in sea level, necessarily, begins
slowly. Massive ice sheets must be soft-
ened and weakened before rapid disinte-
gration and melting occurs and the sea
level rises. It may require as much as a
few centuries to produce most of the long-
term response. But the inertia of ice sheets
is not our ally against the effects of glob-
al warming. The Earth’s history reveals
cases in which sea level, once ice sheets
began to collapse, rose one meter (1.1
yards) every twenty years for centuries.
That would be a calamity for hundreds of
cities around the world, most of them far
larger than New Orleans. Devastation
from a rising sea occurs as the result of
local storms which can be expected to
cause repeated retreats from transitory
shorelines and rebuilding away from
them.
Satellite images and other data have
revealed the initial response of ice sheets
to global warming. The area on Greenland
in which summer melting of ice took
place increased more than 50 percent dur-
ing the last twenty-five years. Meltwater
descends through crevasses to the ice
sheet base, where it provides lubrication
that increases the movement of the ice
sheet and the discharge of giant icebergs
into the ocean. The volume of icebergs
from Greenland has doubled in the last ten
years. Seismic stations reveal a shocking
increase in “icequakes” on Greenland,
caused by a portion of an ice sheet lurch-
ing forward and grinding to a halt. The
annual number of these icequakes regis-
tering 4.6 or greater on the Richter scale
doubled from 7 in 1993 to 14 in the late
1990s; it doubled again by 2005. A satel-
lite that measures minute changes in
Earth’s gravitational field found the mass
of Greenland to have decreased by 50
cubic miles of ice in 2005. West
Antarctica’s mass decreased by a similar
amount.
The effect of this loss of ice on the
global sea level is small, so far, but it is
accelerating. The likelihood of the sudden
collapse of ice sheets increases as global
warming continues. For example, wet ice
is darker, absorbing more sunlight, which
increases the melting rate of the ice. Also,
the warming ocean melts the offshore
accumulations of ice—”ice shelves”—
that form a barrier between the ice sheets
and the ocean. As the ice shelves melt,
more icebergs are discharged from the ice
sheets into the ocean. And as the ice sheet
discharges more icebergs into the ocean
and loses mass, its surface sinks to a lower
level where the temperature is warmer,
causing it to melt faster.
The business-as-usual scenario, with
five degrees Fahrenheit global warming
and ten degrees Fahrenheit at the ice
sheets, certainly would cause the disinte-
gration of ice sheets. The only question is
when the collapse of these sheets would
begin. The business-as-usual scenario,
which could lead to an eventual sea level
rise of eighty feet, with twenty feet or
more per century, could produce global
chaos, leaving fewer resources with
which to mitigate the change in climate.
The alternative scenario, with global
warming under two degrees Fahrenheit,
still produces a significant rise in the sea
level, but its slower rate, probably less
than a few feet per century, would allow
time to develop strategies that would
adapt to, and mitigate, the rise in the sea
level.
Both the Department of Energy
and some fossil fuel companies
insist that continued growth of fos-
sil fuel use and of CO2 emissions are facts
that cannot be altered to any great extent.
Their prophecies become self-fulfilling,
with the help of government subsidies and
intensive efforts by special interest groups
to prevent the public from becoming well-
informed.
In reality, an alternative scenario is
possible and makes sense for other rea-
sons, especially in the US, which has
become an importer of energy, hemor-
rhaging wealth to foreign nations in order
to pay for it. In response to oil shortages
and price rises in the 1970s, the US
slowed its growth in energy use mainly by
requiring an increase from thirteen to
twenty-four miles per gallon in the stan-
dard of auto efficiency. Economic growth
was decoupled from growth in the use of
fossil fuels and the gains in efficiency
were felt worldwide. Global growth of
CO2 emissions slowed from more than 4
percent each year to between 1 and 2 per-
cent growth each year.
This slower growth rate in fossil fuel
use was maintained despite lower energy
prices. The US is still only half as efficient
in its use of energy as Western Europe,
i.e., the US emits twice as much CO2 to
produce a unit of GNP, partly because
Europe encourages efficiency by fossil
fuel taxes. China and India, using older
technologies, are less energy-efficient
than the US and have a higher rate of CO2
emissions.
Available technologies would allow
great improvement of energy efficiency,
even in Europe. Economists agree that the
potential could be achieved most effec-
tively by a tax on carbon emissions,
although strong political leadership would
be needed to persuasively explain the case
for such a tax to the public. The tax could
be revenue-neutral, i.e., it could also pro-
vide for tax credits or tax decreases for the
public generally, leaving government rev-
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enue unchanged; and it should be intro-
duced gradually. The consumer who
makes a special effort to save energy
could gain, benefiting from the tax credit
or decrease while buying less fuel; the
well-to-do consumer who insisted on hav-
ing three Hummers would pay for his own
excesses.
Achieving a decline in CO2 emis-
sions faces two major obstacles: the huge
number of vehicles that are inefficient in
their use of fuel and the continuing CO2
emissions from power plants. Auto mak-
ers oppose efficiency standards and
prominently advertise their heaviest and
most powerful vehicles, which yield the
greatest short-term profits. Coal compa-
nies want new coal-fired power plants to
be built soon, thus assuring long-term
profits.
The California legislature has passed
a regulation requiring a 30 percent reduc-
tion in automobile greenhouse gas emis-
sions by 2016. If adopted nationwide, this
regulation would save more than $150 bil-
lion annually in oil imports. In thirty-five
years it would save seven times the
amount of oil estimated by the US
Geological Services to exist in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge. By fighting it in
court, automakers and the Bush adminis-
tra-tion have stymied the California law,
which many other states stand ready to
adopt. Further reductions of emissions
would be possible by means of technolo-
gies now being developed. For example,
new hybrid cars with larger batteries and
the ability to plug into wall outlets will
soon be available; and cars whose bodies
are made of a lightweight carbon compos-
ite would get better mileage.
If power plants are to achieve the
goals of the alternative scenario, construc-
tion of new coal-fired power plants should
be delayed until the technology needed to
capture and sequester their CO2 emis-
sions is available. In the interim, new
electricity requirements should be met by
the use of renewable energies such as
wind power as well as by nuclear power
and other sources that do not produce
CO2. Much could be done to limit emis-
sions by improving the standards of fuel
efficiency in buildings, lighting, and
appliances. Such improvements are
entirely possible, but strong leadership
would be required to bring them about.
The most effective action, as I have indi-
cated, would be a slowly increasing car-
bon tax, which could be revenue-neutral
or would cover a portion of the costs of
mitigating climate change.
The alternative scenario I have been
referring to has been designed to be con-
sistent with the Kyoto Protocol, i.e., with
a world in which emissions from devel-
oped countries would decrease slowly
early in this century and the developing
countries would get help to adopt “clean”
energy technologies that would limit the
growth of their emissions. Delays in that
approach—especially US refusal both to
participate in Kyoto and to improve vehi-
cle and power plant efficiencies—and the
rapid growth in the use of dirty technolo-
gies have resulted in an increase of 2 per-
cent per year in global CO2 emissions
during the past ten years. If such growth
continues for another decade, emissions
in 2015 will be 35 percent greater than
they were in 2000, making it impractical
to achieve results close to the alternative
scenario.
The situation is critical, because of
the clear difference between the two sce-
narios I have projected. Further global
warming can be kept within limits (under
two degrees Fahrenheit) only by means of
simultaneous slowdown of CO2 emis-
sions and absolute reduction of the princi-
pal non-CO2agents of global warming,
particularly emissions of methane gas.
Such methane emissions are not only the
second-largest human contribution to cli-
mate change but also the main cause of an
increase in ozone—the third-largest
human-produced greenhouse gas—in the
troposphere, the lowest part of the Earth’s
atmosphere. Practical methods can be
used to reduce human sources of methane
emission, for example, at coal mines,
landfills, and waste management facili-
ties. However, the question is whether
these reductions will be overwhelmed by
the release of frozen methane hydrates—
the ice-like crystals in which large
deposits of methane are trapped—if per-
mafrost melts.
If both the slowdown in CO2 emis-
sions and reductions in non-CO2 emis-
sions called for by the alternative scenario
are achieved, release of “frozen methane”
should be moderate, judging from prior
interglacial periods that were warmer than
today by one or two degrees Fahrenheit.
But if CO2 emissions are not limited and
further warming reaches three or four
degrees Fahrenheit, all bets are off.
Indeed, there is evidence that greater
warming could release substantial
amounts of methane in the Arctic. Much
of the ten-degree Fahrenheit global warm-
ing that caused mass extinctions, such as
the one at the Paleocene-Eocene bound-
ary, appears to have been caused by
release of “frozen methane.” Those
releases of methane may have taken place
over centuries or millennia, but release of
even a significant fraction of the methane
during this century could accelerate glob-
al warming, preventing achievement of
the alternative scenario and possibly caus-
ing ice sheet disintegration and further
long-term methane release that are out of
our control.
Any responsible assessment of envi-
ronmental impact must conclude that fur-
ther global warming exceeding two
degrees Fahrenheit will be dangerous. Yet
because of the global warming already
bound to take place as a result of the con-
tinuing long-term effects of greenhouse
gases and the energy systems now in use,
the two-degree Fahrenheit limit will be
exceeded unless a change in direction can
begin during the current decade. Unless
this fact is widely communicated, and
decision-makers are responsive, it will
soon be impossible to avoid climate
change with far-ranging undesirable con-
sequences. We have reached a critical tip-
ping point.
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The public can act as our planet’s keeper, as has been
shown in the past. The first human-made atmospheric
crisis emerged in 1974, when the chemists Sherry
Rowland and Mario Molina reported that chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) might destroy the stratospheric ozone layer that pro-
tects animal and plant life from the sun’s harmful ultraviolet
rays. How narrowly we escaped disaster was not realized until
years later.
CFC appeared to be a marvelous inert chemical, one so
useful as an aerosol propellant, fire suppressor, and refrigerant
fluid that CFC production increased 10 percent per year for
decades. If this business-as-usual growth of CFCs had contin-
ued just one more decade, the stratospheric ozone layer would
have been severely depleted over the entire planet and CFCs
themselves would have caused a larger greenhouse effect than
CO2.
Instead, the press and television reported Rowland and
Molina’s warning widely. The public, responding to the warn-
ings of environmental groups, boycotted frivolous use of CFCs
as propellants for hair spray and deodorant, and chose non-
CFC products instead. The annual growth of CFC usage plum-
meted immediately from 10 percent to zero. Thus no new facil-
ities to produce CFCs were built. The principal CFC manufac-
turer, after first questioning the scientific evidence, developed
alternative chemicals. When the use of CFCs for refrigeration
began to increase and a voluntary phaseout of CFCs for that
purpose proved ineffective, the US and European governments
took the lead in negotiating the Montreal Protocol to control the
production of CFCs. Developing countries were allowed to
increase the use of CFCs for a decade and they were given
financial assistance to construct alternative chemical plants.
The result is that the use of CFCs is now decreasing, the ozone
layer was damaged but not destroyed, and it will soon be recov-
ering.
Why are the same scientists and political forces that suc-
ceeded in controlling the threat to the ozone layer now failing
miserably to deal with the global warming crisis? Though we
depend on fossil fuels far more than we ever did on CFCs, there
is plenty of blame to go around. Scientists present the facts
about climate change clinically, failing to stress that business-
as-usual will transform the planet. The press and television,
despite an overwhelming scientific consensus concerning glob-
al warming, give equal time to fringe “contrarians” supported
by the fossil fuel industry. Special interest groups mount effec-
tive disinformation campaigns to sow doubt about the reality of
global warming. The government appears to be strongly influ-
enced by special interests, or otherwise confused and distract-
ed, and it has failed to provide leadership. The public is under-
standably confused or uninterested.
I used to spread the blame uniformly until, when I was
about to appear on public television, the producer informed me
that the program “must” also include a “contrarian” who would
take issue with claims of global warming. Presenting such a
view, he told me, was a common practice in commercial televi-
sion as well as radio and newspapers. Supporters of public TV
WHAT WE MUST DO
Flannery concludes, as I have, that we have only a short
time to address global warming before it runs out of con-
trol. However, his call for people to reduce their CO2
emissions, while appropriate, oversimplifies and diverts
attention from the essential requirement: government
leadership. Without such leadership and comprehensive
economic policies, conservation of energy by individuals
merely reduces demands for fuel, thus lowering prices
and ultimately promoting the wasteful use of energy. I was
glad to see that in a recent article in these pages, he wrote
that an effective fossil energy policy should include a tax
on carbon emissions.[2] 
A good energy policy, economists agree, is not difficult to
define. Fuel taxes should encourage conservation, but
with rebates to taxpayers so that the government revenue
from the tax does not increase. The taxpayer can use his
rebate to fill his gas-guzzler if he likes, but most people
will eventually reduce their use of fuel in order to save
money, and will spend the rebate on something else. With
slow and continual increases of fuel cost, energy con-
sumption will decline. The economy will not be harmed.
Indeed, it will be improved since the trade deficit will be
reduced; so will the need to protect US access to energy
abroad by means of diplomatic and military action. US
manufacturers would be forced to emphasize energy effi-
ciency in order to make their products competitive interna-
tionally. Our automakers need not go bankrupt.
Would this approach result in fewer ultraheavy SUVs on
the road? Probably. Would it slow the trend toward bigger
houses with higher ceilings? Possibly. But experts say
that because technology has sufficient potential to
become more efficient, our quality of life need not decline.
In order for this to happen, the price of energy should
reflect its true cost to society.
Do we have politicians with the courage to explain to the
public what is needed? Or may it be that such people are
not electable, in view of the obstacles presented by tele-
vision, campaign financing, and the opposition of energy
companies and other special interests? That brings me to
Al Gore’s book and movie of the same name: An
Inconvenient Truth. Both are unconventional, based on a
“slide show” that Gore has given more than one thousand
times. They are filled with pictures—stunning illustrations,
maps, graphs, brief explanations, and stories about peo-
ple who have important parts in the global warming story
or in Al Gore’s life. The movie seems to me powerful and
the book complements it, adding useful explanations. It is
hard to predict how this unusual presentation will be
received by the public; but Gore has put together a coher-
ent account of a complex topic that Americans desperate-
ly need to understand. The story is scientifically accurate
and yet should be understandable to the public, a public
that is less and less drawn to science.
4.
Spring/Summer 2007 7
or advertisers, with their own special
interests, require “balance” as a price for
their continued financial support. Gore’s
book reveals that while more than half of
the recent newspaper articles on climate
change have given equal weight to such
contrarian views, virtually none of the sci-
entific articles in peer-reviewed journals
have questioned the consensus that emis-
sions from human activities cause global
warming. As a result, even when the sci-
entific evidence is clear, technical nit-
picking by contrarians leaves the public
with the false impression that there is still
great scientific uncertainty about the real-
ity and causes of climate change.
The executive and legislative branch-
es of the US government seek excuses to
justify their inaction. The President,
despite conclusive reports from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and the National Academy of
Sciences, welcomes contrary advice from
Michael Crichton, a science fiction writer.
Senator James Inhofe, chairman of the
Committee on Environment and Public
Works, describes global warming as “the
greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the
American people” and has used aggres-
sive tactics, including a lawsuit to sup-
press a federally funded report on climate
change, to threaten and intimidate scien-
tists.
Policies favoring the short-term prof-
its of energy companies and other special
interests are cast by many politicians as
being in the best economic interests of the
country. They take no account of the
mounting costs of environmental damage
and of the future costs of maintaining the
supply of fossil fuels. Leaders with a
long-term vision would place greater
value on developing more efficient energy
technology and sources of clean energy.
Rather than subsidizing fossil fuels, the
government should provide incentives for
fossil-fuel companies to develop other
kinds of energy.
Who will pay for the tragic effects of
a warming climate? Not the political lead-
ers and business executives I have men-
tioned. If we pass the crucial point and
tragedies caused by climate change begin
to unfold, history will judge harshly the
scientists, reporters, special interests, and
politicians who failed to protect the plan-
et. But our children will pay the conse-
quences.
The US has heavy legal and moral
responsibilities for what is now happen-
ing. Of all the CO2 emissions produced
from fossil fuels so far, we are responsible
for almost 30 percent, an amount much
larger than that of the next-closest coun-
tries, China and Russia, each less than 8
percent. Yet our responsibility and liabili-
ty may run higher than those numbers
suggest. The US cannot validly claim to
be ignorant of the consequences. When
nations must abandon large parts of their
land because of rising seas, what will our
liability be? And will our children, as
adults in the world, carry a burden of
guilt, as Germans carried after World War
II, however unfair inherited blame may
be?
The responsibility of the US goes
beyond its disproportionate share of the
world’s emissions. By refusing to partici-
pate in the Kyoto Protocol, we delayed its
implementation and weakened its effec-
tiveness, thus undermining the attempt of
the international community to slow down
the emissions of developed countries in a
way consistent with the alternative sce-
nario. If the US had accepted the Kyoto
Protocol, it would have been possible to
reduce the growing emissions of China
and India through the Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism, by which the
developed countries could offset their
own continuing emissions by investing in
projects to reduce emissions in the devel-
oping countries. This would have eased
the way to later full participation by China
and India, as occurred with the Montreal
Protocol. The US was right to object to
quotas in the Kyoto Protocol that were
unfair to the US; but an appropriate
response would have been to negotiate
revised quotas, since US political and
technology leadership are essential for
dealing with climate change.
It is not too late. The US hesitated to
enter other conflicts in which the future
was at stake. But enter we did, earning
gratitude in the end, not condemnation.
Such an outcome is still feasible in the
case of global warming, but just barely.
As explained above, we have at most
ten years—not ten years to decide upon
action, but ten years to alter fundamental-
ly the trajectory of global greenhouse
emissions. Our previous decade of inac-
tion has made the task more difficult,
since emissions in the developing world
are accelerating. To achieve the alterna-
tive scenario will require prompt gains in
energy efficiencies so that the supply of
conventional fossil fuels can be sustained
until advanced technologies can be devel-
oped. If instead we follow an energy-
intensive path of squeezing liquid fuels
from tar sands, shale oil, and heavy oil,
and do so without capturing and seques-
tering CO2 emissions, climate disasters
will become unavoidable.
When I recently met Larry King,
he said, “Nobody cares about fifty
years from now.” Maybe so. But
climate change is already evident. And if
we stay on the business-as-usual course,
disastrous effects are no further from us
than we are from the Elvis era. Is it possi-
ble for a single book on global warming to
convince the public, as Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring did for the dangers of DDT?
Bill McKibben’s excellent book The End
of Nature is usually acknowledged as hav-
ing been the most effective so far, but per-
haps what is needed is a range of books
dealing with different aspects of the glob-
al warming story.
Elizabeth Kolbert’s Field Notes,
based on a series of articles she wrote for
The New Yorker, is illuminating and
sobering, a good book to start with. The
reader is introduced to some of the
world’s leading climate researchers who
explain the dangers in reasonably non-
technical language but without sacrificing
scientific accuracy. The book includes
fascinating accounts of how climate
changes affected the planet in the past,
and how such changes are occurring in
different parts of the world right now. If
Field Notes leaves the reader yearning for
more experience in the field, I suggest
Thin Ice by Mark Bowen, which captures
the heroic work of Lonnie Thompson in
extracting unique information on climate
change from some of the most forbidding
and spectacular places on the planet.[1] 
5.
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Tim Flannery’s The Weather Makers puts needed empha-
sis on the effects of human-made climate change on other life
on the planet. Flannery is a remarkable scientist, having discov-
ered and described dozens of mammals in New Guinea, yet he
writes for a general audience with passion and clarity. He con-
siders changes in climate that correspond to what I have
defined as the business-as-usual and alternative scenarios.
Flannery estimates that when we take account of other stresses
on species imposed by human beings, the alternative scenario
will lead to the eventual extinction of 20 percent of today’s
species, while continuing with business-as-usual will cause 60
percent to become extinct. Some colleagues will object that he
extrapolates from meager data, but estimates are needed and
Flannery is as qualified as anyone to make them. Fossil records
of mass extinctions support Flannery’s shocking estimate of the
potential for climate change to extinguish life.
The reader might assume that I have long been close to
Gore, since I testified before his Senate committee in 1989 and
participated in scientific “roundtable” discussions in his Senate
office. In fact, Gore was displeased when I declined to provide
him with images of increasing drought generated by a comput-
er model of climate change. (I didn’t trust the model’s estimates
of precipitation.) After Clinton and Gore were elected, I
declined a suggestion from the White House to write a rebuttal
to a New York Times Op-Ed article that played down global
warming and criticized the Vice President. I did not hear from
Gore for more than a decade, until January of this year, when
he asked me to critically assess his slide show. When we met,
he said that he “wanted to apologize,” but, without letting him
explain what he was apologizing for, I said, “Your insight was
better than mine.”
Indeed, Gore was prescient. For decades he has maintained
that the Earth was teetering in the balance, even when doing so
subjected him to ridicule from other politicians and cost him
votes. By telling the story of climate change with striking clar-
ity in both his book and movie, Al Gore may have done for
global warming what Silent Spring did for pesticides. He will
be attacked, but the public will have the information needed to
distinguish our long-term well-being from short-term special
interests.
An Inconvenient Truth is about Gore himself as well as
global warming. It shows the man that I met in the 1980s at sci-
entific roundtable discussions, passionate and knowledgeable,
true to the message he has delivered for years. It makes one
wonder whether the American public has not been deceived by
the distorted images of him that have been presented by the
press and television. Perhaps the country came close to having
the leadership it needed to deal with a grave threat to the plan-
et, but did not realize it.
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For decades, scientists have known that human activity –
primarily the consumption of fossil fuels and the clearing or
burning of forested areas — is significantly increasing the vol-
ume of carbon dioxide and other so-called “greenhouse gases”
emitted into the atmosphere. Since the beginning of the indus-
trial age, CO2 concentrations have increased by more than 30%
and they are forecast to double or even quadruple throughout
the current century, depending upon population and economic
growth rates. Even while this “large scale geophysical experi-
ment” has been conducted – a label ominously applied by
oceanographer Roger Revelle some fifty years ago – scientists
have become more-and-more certain that the greenhouse gas
increases are contributing to global climate changes that will
likely have devastating consequences.1 The February 2007
“Summary for Policymakers” released by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change confirms key link-
ages between human activity and climate change. Indeed, the
IPCC’s fourth assessment, which has already been criticized
for being too cautious about the causes and consequences of
climate change, provides a sobering reminder that humans are
profoundly transforming the Earth’s environment. The 2500
scientists from over 130 countries signed on to a report declar-
ing a “very high confidence” (defined as “at least 9 out of 10
chance of being correct”) “that the globally averaged net effect
of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming.”
Climate system temperature increases are described as
“unequivocal.”2
Consequently, the planet potentially faces the melting of
much of its polar ice caps and glaciers, the unprecedented
flooding of its coastal areas and islands, mass extinction of
innumerable plant and animal species, worrying shifts in agri-
cultural patterns, and the creation of tens of millions of human
environmental refugees. To understand some of the horrific
social and economic implications of these changes, imagine
dozens of world cities and even entire nations facing prolonged
catastrophes as shocking as the 2004 Asian tsunami or the 2005
hurricanes that obliterated much of the southern gulf coast of
the United States. Those natural disasters may merely hint at
the potential consequences of the weather-related disasters yet
to come.  
To prevent calamitous global climate change, the world
will simply have to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.
Fundamentally, this means altering energy consumption pat-
terns because the burning of fossil fuels is responsible for
three-quarters of CO2 releases. Technologically and economi-
cally, changing energy habits will not be easily achieved. The
world is heavily dependent upon oil, coal, and natural gas and
current infrastructures associated with energy systems reflect a
significant financial commitment to the current methods of
extracting, processing and utilizing fossil fuels. Nearly seven
hundred million passenger cars and trucks, for example,
account for about 10% of global greenhouse gas emissions. No
single vehicle emits a globally significant amount of pollution,
meaning that a worldwide transformation will be required to
make meaningful emission reductions in the transportation sec-
tor. Furthermore, most of the world’s electricity is generated by
fossil fuel combustion in power plants. This use will not be
readily replaced and accounts for about 40% of total emissions.
The agricultural sector, air and sea vessels, and factories also
rely extensively upon fossil fuels and will need to be retooled
at great expense if humans are to move from these energy
sources to others across the next decades. 
In many ways, however, the political undertaking may be
even more difficult than the technical and economic, despite
the fact that the international community has been working
towards limiting emissions for more than two decades. Perhaps
the greatest barrier is raised by the world’s wealthiest and most
powerful nation-state, which has essentially abandoned the
international effort to prevent climate change. Rather than take
a lead role, the United States has clearly been responsible for
slowing global cooperative efforts and overtly rebuffs binding
international commitments to reduce emissions. For a variety
of reasons, a number of other reluctant nations have joined the
US in refusing to accept global standards on emissions.
Additionally, the entire developing world is currently exempt
from those same regulations. In several important ways, unfor-
tunately, the global politics of climate change occurs in a com-
petitive rather than a cooperative negotiation context. Even the
existing agreement to reduce emissions – known as the Kyoto
Protocol – may fail on its own terms, as many of the industri-
alized states that have committed to the treaty stand poised to
break their promises. Perhaps worst of all, Kyoto must at best
be viewed as merely a beginning since it requires only modest
reductions in emissions that will not long forestall the worst
effects of climate change. Far greater reductions in greenhouse
gases must be achieved.
International Politics: the Problem of Anarchy
While 168 countries and the European Union were able to
negotiate and put into effect a formal treaty requiring signifi-
cant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, the agreement
does not oblige the world’s largest polluter to cut its discharges.
The United States produces about one-fourth of the planet’s
greenhouse gases and is responsible for about one-third of the
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emissions among the developed countries now regulated under
the Kyoto Protocol by the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC). However, America’s unwillingness to ratify
that treaty means that the US is not bound by the terms. This is
not at all atypical, as environmental agreements, arms control
deals, human rights accords, and virtually all other internation-
al treaties apply only to those nation-states that agree to obey.
International political life is not governed by a central authori-
ty that can pass and enforce universal laws. Indeed, scholars
use the term “anarchy” to describe the relations among states.
The world’s territory is divided into sovereign nation-states that
are not subservient to anything like a world government. Each
state has virtual free reign to design its own energy policy, to
clear-cut its own forested areas, or even to refuse to observe
pollution emission rules favored by the other states. 
Hypothetically, of course, the coun-
tries of the world could decide to act
together to overcome a common securi-
ty threat like climate change. In reality,
however, the most powerful states,
which burn most of the world’s fossil
fuels and produce most greenhouse
emissions, have a long history of rivalry,
competition, and even conflict with one
another that would seem to belie their
working together to solve many commu-
nal problems. The past hundred years
has been scarred by two world wars,
nearly a half century of divisive cold
war, and a large number of lesser strug-
gles and disagreements. The collapse of
the Soviet Union and the end of bipolar
rivalry did not trigger a new friendly era
of global cooperation. During the 1990s,
the United States and its European allies
could not convince Russia that the
United Nations should act militarily in
the Balkans over Kosovo’s fate.
Likewise, the UN’s strongest states were unable to agree to act
preventively in Rwanda to stop a foreseeable genocide that ulti-
mately killed hundreds of thousands of people. The US in the
1990s refused to join many of its closest western allies in a
variety of international treaties that they strongly favored.
These accords would have prohibited the deployment of anti-
personnel landmines, created an International Criminal Court
to prosecute crimes against humanity, and banned all nuclear
test explosions. In each instance, the US cited strategic
American interests and concerns that kept if from going along
with much of the rest of the world. 
All too often, in fact, narrow self interests preclude mean-
ingful international cooperation. Unfortunately, the prospects
of global cooperation are not especially high even when states
agree about the need for common action to reduce a shared
threat. After the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon, most nation-states rallied
behind the US in an apparently unified global “war on terror-
ism.” Indeed, the surprise assault sparked virtually all of the
world’s key states to form a “coalition of the willing” to com-
bat terrorism. Practically no states protested when the coalition
first directed its attention at Afghanistan in a battle to root out
the Taliban government. However, the common cause was
short-lived as major powers were soon openly clashing when
the prospect of fighting Iraq and toppling Saddam Hussein was
elevated to the top of the international agenda. Long-time close
American allies like France and Germany worked openly to try
to stop the US from starting such a war. These states interpret-
ed the situation very differently and favored their own pro-
posed solutions. Again, these are typical roadblocks to cooper-
ation in international political life.
For virtually any problem, especial-
ly one as complex as climate change,
states are likely to have different under-
standings of the circumstances and may
have unique interests that either pre-
clude their working together or compel
them to advocate proposals that others
will reject. Countries might disagree,
for instance, about the level of sacrifice
each would need to make towards
achieving a common end. Collective
action typically cannot be achieved
without someone paying at least some
costs and not even a shared fear of a
mounting threat can assure that every
state will voluntarily pay those costs.
The problem is especially acute if any
single state is asked to make a contribu-
tion larger than it is willing to pay – or
greater, proportionally, than other states
are asked to supply. 
In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, neither Bill Clinton, who
was President when the deal was struck in 1997, nor his succes-
sor George W. Bush, has ever asked the US Senate to consider
the climate change treaty. Indeed, shortly after taking office in
2001, President Bush condemned the Kyoto Protocol as “fatal-
ly flawed” and Vice President Dick Cheney called it a “dead
proposition” that the United States “would not be bound by.”3
Unfortunately for the planet, it is nearly impossible to imagine
any successful international agreement addressing the problem
of global warming without American cooperation. The Kyoto
Protocol and any follow-on agreement is likely doomed to fail
without a significant change in American policy. To repeat, this
is largely because the US, with less than 5% of the world’s pop-
ulation, emits about a quarter of greenhouse gases. 
Unfortunately for the planet, it
is nearly impossible to imagine
any successful international
agreement addressing the
problem of global warming
without American cooperation.
The Kyoto Protocol and any
follow-on agreement is likely
doomed to fail without a
significant change in American
policy. To repeat, this is largely
because the US, with less than
5% of the world’s population,
emits about a quarter of
greenhouse gases.
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Why does the US oppose the Kyoto Protocol? Has the US
consistently worked in opposition to a convention limiting
greenhouse gas emissions? Have the climate change negotia-
tors been undercut by selfishness?
The History of American Intransigence 
While the US has long been reluctant to join other states in
regulating greenhouse gases,  it has not always overtly
obstructed the international political process. After a series of
informal global conferences in the 1980s about the so-called
“greenhouse effect,” which often included US representatives
and scientists, the United Nations Environment Program and
World Meteorological Organization established the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IPCC was
formed in 1988 to provide a comprehensive and expert assess-
ment of this phenomenon as scientists and policymakers alike
wanted to understand the causes of climate change, the poten-
tial impacts, and the available options for mitigating the causes
and/or effects. The three IPCC Working Groups – the US
chaired one on responses to global warming – reported their
initial findings to the UN General Assembly and to a World
Climate Conference in fall 1990. These first reports reflected a
scientific consensus that the greenhouse effect was real and
was being worsened by human activity. Thanks partly to this
input, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in
December 1990 that established an Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee (INC) that could meet and bargain
towards a formal international treaty to address the problem. 
Many optimistic observers hoped that negotiators intended
to achieve a climate change pact by traversing the political
pathway blazed during the 1980s to address another atmospher-
ic environmental concern. With the active participation and
leadership of a US negotiating team appointed by President
Ronald Reagan, nations agreed in a series of bargaining ses-
sions to mitigate the environmental hazards linked to a class of
man-made chemicals known as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).
After their use on earth, these chemicals were eventually
migrating to the atmosphere and thinning the ozone layer.
Sadly, adding CFCs to O3 was a double whammy because the
chemical changes reducing the concentration of ozone yielded
CO2 as one unfortunate byproduct! Simply by limiting produc-
tion and consumption of these harmful man-made chemicals,
the so-called Montreal Protocol could preserve the ozone layer
and thereby prevent ultra-violet radiation from causing untold
numbers of future skin cancers. It is only a small exaggeration
to suggest that the international agreement protected in some
fashion virtually all life on the earth, from phytoplankton to
humans. In any case, for extremely sound reasons, the 1987
Montreal is viewed as the gold standard for formulating inter-
national environmental agreements. Under the pact, a baseline
emissions year was established. Next, production and use of
CFCs vis-à-vis this base year was reduced — and then CFCs
were almost completely banned. States also created a multilat-
eral fund to help poor countries adopt alternative technologies
so that they would not be tempted to purchase CFC products
prohibited in the industrialized world. 
Proponents of international action on climate change, how-
ever, must acknowledge that the Montreal Protocol was in
many ways unique. The manufacture and use of CFCs was pri-
marily limited to a relatively small number of affluent states.
Developing countries as a whole produced less than 5 percent
of the chemicals. CFCs had functional purposes – as a refriger-
ant, a cleaning solvent for electronics, a propellant in aerosol
containers, and as the gas that puffed plastic into Styrofoam –
but these ultimately proved amenable to relatively inexpensive
replacement. The corporations that produced CFCs derived
substantial revenues from their goods, but some key manufac-
turers like DuPont declared quite early on that they were will-
ing and likely able to make viable substitutes. Moreover, CFC
consumption did not constitute a significant portion of the
global economy. The multibillion dollar CFC production indus-
try was concentrated in only about 20 companies. Finally, the
Environmental Protection Agency had already banned
nonessential CFC use in 1978 and the US assumed a genuine
leadership role in the negotiations. In all, this was a welcoming
context in which to negotiate a deal.
Knowledgeable onlookers realize that it would be very dif-
ficult to duplicate the success of the Montreal Protocol, with or
without active American leadership. The evidence about glob-
al warming may be backed by fairly strong scientific consen-
sus, but the US and other states have periodically contested the
need to act upon information they viewed as simply too uncer-
tain given the great costs likely associated with a transforma-
tion of the world’s energy use patterns. Scientists willing to
challenge the assembled evidence quickly assumed prominent
positions in the American public debate. Numerous transna-
tional corporations, including the world’s major oil companies,
and many nation-states have a much greater economic interest
in the stakes and these actors worked aggressively to stall nego-
tiations. In the US, ExxonMobil played a particularly vigorous
role in financing a long-term public relations campaign
designed to cast doubt on the science and raised many ques-
tions about the economic and technical feasibility of cutting
fossil fuel use.
Nonetheless, countries completed a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in advance of the UN
Conference on Environment and Development, which was held
in June 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Because negotiators
knew that the “Earth Summit” was a symbolically important
event, they effectively operated under a deadline and made
remarkably rapid progress in the sessions leading up to the June
conference. During the negotiations, however, the US under the
administration of George Herbert Walker Bush refused to allow
the proposed agreement to establish either targeted emission
reductions or a legally binding timetable.  As the world’s lead-
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ing emitter of gases, the US was already
viewed as vital to any solution. It could
thus effectively use its position and
establish informal veto power by block-
ing emission reduction requirements.
Though the FCCC signed at the Rio
“Earth Summit” included no provisions
requiring states to reduce emission of
greenhouse gases and thus reflected
minimal agreement, parties preferred
this to inaction.
Under the 1992 treaty, industrial-
ized nations (included in Annex I of the
Convention) agreed merely to “aim” to
return their emissions to 1990 levels by
the year 2000. Annex I countries were
also charged with developing national
policies to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions, though they were allowed the
option of “joint implementation.” In
practice, this meant obtaining credit for
emission reductions by helping other
states, potentially including those in the
developing world, reduce their pollu-
tion. The convention also created meas-
ures requiring states to provide invento-
ries of greenhouse gas discharges and to
report on their development of national
emission reduction plans. Poor develop-
ing states of the Global South tried to
obtain pledges of increased development
assistance in order that they too might be
able to achieve emission reductions, but
the final version of the original treaty
did not include a provision for this pur-
pose. Yet, the world’s richest states
agreed in the treaty to “provide new and
additional financial resources to meet
the agreed full costs” for developing
countries to meet their reporting require-
ments.4 This would at least allow states a
way to calculate accurately the rate of
emission growth – and would provide
baseline data for joint implementation.
At the Earth Summit, a pilot Global
Environment Facility was named the
interim agency that would pool and dis-
tribute these financial resources. In
1999, after a significant restructuring
that more clearly distinguished its mis-
sion from that of the relatively unpopu-
lar World Bank, the GEF became the
convention’s permanent financial mech-
anism.
More than 150 states signed the
FCCC in Rio and it entered into force in
March 1994, three months after the fifti-
eth ratification. The US was the first
industrialized state to ratify the conven-
tion. As of February 2007, 189 countries
have joined the treaty. Most importantly,
given the failure to require emissions
reductions, the FCCC established a
Conference of the Parties (COP) to con-
tinue negotiations. The COP, which is
comprised of all state members to the
pact, met formally on a number of occa-
sions over the next few years to discuss
the key unresolved issues. At the COP-1
in Berlin in spring 1995, an Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS) pressed
mightily for a convention protocol that
would require emission reductions. The
leaders of AOSIS had very strong inter-
ests in global warming since their
nations were potentially quite vulnerable
to future increases in sea level caused by
melting ice caps. No agreement on emis-
sions reductions emerged from COP-1
as very few states were prepared to take
that step and the AOSIS states were sim-
ply too weak to have influence on their
more powerful peers. The COP-2 meet-
ing in Geneva in 1996 also failed to
reach an agreement on this issue. One
important concession was attained, how-
ever, as President Clinton’s negotiators
did agree that the US would commit to
legally binding reductions on emissions.
The devil was in the details, as is so
often said, because precise cuts were yet
to be settled.
After some additional heated nego-
tiations, participants in 1997 ultimately
approved specific binding emission
reductions in the Kyoto Protocol. This
deal established 1990 as the baseline
year for emissions and set the years
2008-2012 as the target dates for reduc-
tions. The developed states, again
known as Annex I countries, commit on
average to 5.2% emission reductions
from the 1990 base. However, states
were assigned different responsibilities
and developing countries were exempt-
ed altogether from the requirements. By
agreement, the US was assigned a target
of 7% reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions from the 1990 base year, though its
actual obligations were mitigated signif-
icantly by the acceptance of an
American plan to credit states for the
successful management of so-called
“carbon sinks” by employing environ-
mentally friendly land use techniques
and innovative forestry practices. Article
12 of the Kyoto Protocol additionally
creates a Clean Development
Mechanism to allow Annex I states to
gain credits for emission reductions in
developing states not bound by the
treaty. The major negotiating parties had
been deeply divided about many pro-
posed provisions and the Protocol actu-
ally reflected only limited agreement. To
its credit, the Protocol overcame most
national divisions about the specific
emission reductions to be required and
the various gases that would be covered
by the treaty. 
President Clinton signed the Kyoto
accord in November 1998, but pointed
to an unwelcoming Senate resolution
from 1997 (which passed 95-0) and indi-
cated that he would not submit the
agreement to that body for its “advice
and consent” until a subsequent addi-
tional deal more satisfactory to US inter-
ests was concluded. Specifically, the
Senate resolution identified two key
American policy concerns that were not
successfully resolved in the Kyoto deal.
The Senate recommended that the U.S.
not become a signatory to any interna-
tional protocol that would “result in seri-
ous harm to the economy” or that would
“mandate new commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the
Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or
other agreement also mandates new spe-
cific scheduled commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for
Developing Country Parties within the
same compliance period.”5
American Economic Interests
To keep Kyoto-related costs down,
the US very much favored market-
friendly emissions trading plans, along
the lines of joint implementation.
Economists often argue that such
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approaches are the preferred method of
pollution abatement because they
encourage much greater efficiency as
compared to fixed regulatory standards.
In other words, such mechanisms would
meet environmental goals at lower costs.
Critics of environmental regulations
have long claimed that standards can be
too costly if they require every company
to meet requirements. While newer
industries might already meet and
exceed a new standard thanks to their
use of the latest technologies, older
industries might not be able to meet a
toughened standard without making pro-
hibitively expensive changes. Under a
trading plan, every company in every
participating country could be allotted a
specific number of pollution credits
under the law. The number of total cred-
its would be pegged to the target goal of
emission reduction. The greenest com-
panies (or nation-states), with credits to
spare, could sell some of theirs to the
most polluting  industries (or nation-
states) who might prefer buying credits
to closing shop. The overall standard
would therefore be met at the lowest fea-
sible cost, as set in the marketplace.
Moreover, the market could be open to
environmentalists as well, since they too
could buy pollution credits. By purchas-
ing and retiring credits, environmental
groups could effectively toughen inter-
national pollution standards without
additional regulatory action. 
For fairly obvious reasons,
American businesses vulnerable to envi-
ronmental standards often strongly pre-
fer these kind of market-based mecha-
nisms. The US Clean Air Act, in fact,
has for many years allowed pollution
trading. However, other countries have
been greatly divided as to whether to
embrace these mechanisms. Influential
environmental groups from around the
world especially fear that industrialized
states will not make any technological or
resource use changes if granted the
option to comply merely through emis-
sions trading or joint implementation.
These advanced states might simply
build new factories in the Global South
or buy pollution credits from states with
surpluses to offset their own obligations.
Effectively, opponents argued, the rich-
est states and their industries would be
allowed to pay to pollute. In the end, res-
olution of this particular dispute was
deferred until future COP negotiations.
Likewise, the Kyoto agreement did
not address the US demand that devel-
oping countries should be required to
reduce their emissions. The US claimed
that industrialized states might make
significant and costly reductions in pol-
lution, but that countries like China and
India would offset even effective
changes by substantially increasing their
own fossil fuel consumption and emis-
sions. China already emits 15% of the
world’s greenhouse gases and has one of
the world’s fastest growing economies
to go along with an enormous popula-
tion. Its future may include tens of mil-
lions of new automobiles and hundreds
of new coal-fired power plants. While
US officials often called for Chinese and
Indian inclusion as a means to strength-
en the treaty, they were also well aware
that the exclusion of these states effec-
tively provided them with advantages in
the global marketplace. Transnational
and domestic companies could build
new factories in China and not have to
worry about the overall level of green-
house gas emissions. If some likewise
closed more polluting plants in Annex I
countries, emissions credits would even
be granted. While economists may be
correct about the relative efficiency of
such a plan, this does not relieve politi-
cians from fears about trade deficits and
lost manufacturing jobs. 
Poorer countries, including China
and India, argued that they should be
exempted from making reductions since
they had not contributed very much to
the atmospheric buildup of greenhouse
gases from the start of the industrial rev-
olution and even now expel only a small
fraction of the emissions of wealthier
countries on a per capita basis. They
often framed their opposition around the
issue of international justice. Would it be
fair to require citizens of the world’s
poorest states to reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions even if each American, on
average, released five to ten times as
much CO2? Many nongovernmental
organizations, who are increasingly
influential on this and other environ-
mental topics, agreed that it was unjust
for wealthy states to demand reductions
in fossil fuel usage by the world’s most
impoverished inhabitants. 
While states individually debated
whether or not to ratify Kyoto, the par-
ties kept meeting to address unresolved
issues. In several successive COP meet-
ings through the late 1990s, in fact, rep-
resentatives from the US and other states
engaged in ongoing talks about enforce-
ment of the Kyoto-mandated emissions
reductions, emissions trading proposals,
and possible credits for greenhouse gas
“sinks.” In the various meetings, the US
continued to bargain for both adoption
of market mechanisms and regulation of
developing countries. The parties were
apparently close to a deal that would sat-
isfy some US concerns in late 2000, but
they were unable to finalize an agree-
ment before the Clinton administration
ended. 
Unsurprisingly, given that her boss
had already renounced Kyoto, interna-
tional environmental diplomats meeting
in Bonn in 2001 booed the new chief US
Delegate, Paula Dobriansky, when she
proclaimed a continuing US commit-
ment to action on climate change. In
short order, the mantle of leadership was
grabbed by the European Union in hopes
of assuring the survival of the FCCC
process. Tough bargaining lead to new
standards describing how industrial
states would limit greenhouse emis-
sions, and a last-minute decision by
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi to go along saved the treaty.
The Europeans achieved a new deal, the
Marrakesh Accords, largely by accept-
ing the Japanese position on carbon-
trapping sinks, or forested areas that
absorb CO2, and by compromising on a
Russian desire for emissions trading.
While these concessions would have
greatly pleased many Clinton-era nego-
tiators representing US and private busi-
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ness interests as recently as November 2000, the Bush admin-
istration still worried that binding reduction targets would harm
the US economy, and its representatives reiterated complaints
that the treaty did not go far enough to require action by devel-
oping countries such as China and India. On many occasions,
President Bush and some Republican members of Congress
even questioned the strength of the scientific evidence.
Recent Developments
The Kyoto Protocol became binding on the member states
in February 2005 once it was ratified by 55 nation-states,
including enough industrialized countries to account for at least
55% of all 1990 emissions. Most crucially,  a set of “likemind-
ed” affluent states led the way. The European Union, Japan and
Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, primarily because
these states genuinely favored the agreement. Russia was con-
vinced to join them two years later, but geopolitics figured
prominently in an odd end game. Because it was impossible to
reach the 55% threshold without either the US or Russia’s
acceptance of the accord, the latter held a remarkably advanta-
geous bargaining position vis-à-vis the member states, which
desperately wanted Russia to join them. President Vladimir
Putin was therefore able to extract Europe’s backing for
Russian accession to the World Trade Organization in exchange
for a commitment to ratify Kyoto. This was a win-win outcome
for Putin as Russia was already in compliance with the deal
after closing many of its most polluting and inefficient factories
in the early 1990s. In fact, rather than paying costs associated
with emissions reductions, Russia would have emission credits
to sell on a global market and knew this long before gaining the
WTO side deal. 
The United States has been joined in vocal opposition to
Kyoto by Australia’s relatively conservative government under
Prime Minister John Howard. Additionally, a number of
African and Middle Eastern states have more quietly ignored
the treaty. Member states of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) have overtly raised a critical
problem that will inevitably influence the global politics of cli-
mate change. While publicly stating their general support for
Kyoto goals, OPEC states argued that they should receive
assistance if climate-related policy changes significantly
undermine the international market for their oil. Though OPEC
economies are heavily dependent upon petroleum export rev-
enues, their calls for aid commitments have not found a recep-
tive audience. Indeed, many other key pivotal states have sig-
nificant fossil fuel reserves and other natural resources that
may well become central issues in future bargaining rounds.
China has vast coal supplies, Canada retains enormous reserves
of petroleum in oil sands, Russia is already tapping its signifi-
cant oil supplies, and Brazil controls the largest remaining
forested areas. If the international community is going to slow
the dramatic increase of greenhouse gas emissions through this
century, many of these natural resources may have to remain
unused. The only alternative would be remarkable technologi-
cal change that would somehow limit carbon emissions.
International negotiators have continued to meet and dis-
cuss climate change since the Kyoto deal was agreed in 1997,
but the only successful follow-up agreement to Kyoto was the
COP-7 Marrakesh Accords, which were agreed in 2001. That
deal set detailed rules for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
and was politically necessary to make Kyoto work better, but it
was not a substantial step towards a more comprehensive plan
to reduce emissions. Given the years that have now passed, it
seems apparent that states are not strictly following the
Montreal Protocol model, which relatively quickly reduced and
ultimately banned CFC production. The most recent COP-12
meetings were held in Nairobi, Kenya, in November 2006 and
those talks continued to focus extensively on implementation
issues. Parties to the convention discussed questions about the
capacity of developing countries to meet many of the adverse
impacts of global climate change, the development of clean
technology projects in Africa and other poorer regions, and the
future of financial mechanisms to help assist these states. There
is no deal to require additional emission cuts, nor even a
timetable for bargaining about such reductions. Independently,
however, European Union countries have announced plans to
reduce emissions by 20% by 2020. 
Meanwhile, numerous reports suggest that many affluent
state parties to the Kyoto deal are not making significant strides
towards reducing emissions, even though the target dates are
now imminent. Thanks to the various market mechanisms
included in the treaty, a state like Japan, which has seen
increased emissions since the 1990 base year, can “buy its way
out” of noncompliance by trading emissions or by financing
environmentally-friendly projects in the developing world.
This is just as many environmentalists feared. Technically, this
would mean that these states are meeting their international
commitments, but the world will not be able to slow and reduce
the effects of climate change until even the most affluent states
bring their emissions under control. This is especially impor-
tant given the most recent findings from an array of scientific
reports, including the IPCC’s latest consensus assessment,
which suggest that emissions reductions far in excess of Kyoto
will ultimately be needed if the most disastrous consequences
of climate change are to be avoided. The European Union
states, for instance, want to see total global emissions peak
within the next two decades, followed by a 15 to 50% reduc-
tion in total emissions by 2050. Those kinds of ambitious tar-
gets, as already noted, will require remarkable transformation
of the world’s energy systems. Developing states, including
China and India, eventually must make commitments and
changes to reduce their net emissions.
Obviously, a successful global plan will require participa-
tion by the United States. Is there any reason to believe that the
US will finally embrace the world’s efforts to limit climate
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change? Actually, there are many reasons to believe that
Americans are starting to think seriously about global warm-
ing. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina shocked the nation’s
psyche and many scientists publicly blamed the phenomenon
of increasingly powerful hurricanes on climate change and
human activity. Former Vice President Al Gore’s critically
acclaimed film, “An Inconvenient Truth,” won the Academy
Award for Best Documentary. At the box office, it is the third
highest grossing documentary released since 1982. Public
opinion poll results reveal that the overwhelming majority of
Americans consider global warming a threat to future genera-
tions. Indeed, nearly 70% of Americans think that their govern-
ment should do more to address global warming.6 Even
President Bush called global climate change a “serious chal-
lenge” in the 2007 State of the Union speech, which marked the
first time he had referenced the problem in his annual agenda-
setting address.7
Previously, the Bush administration had merely announced
a series of related efforts that encouraged voluntary public-pri-
vate partnerships to reduce emissions. Meanwhile, US green-
house gas emissions have increased about 1% per year through
the Bush presidency – just as they did throughout the 1990s.
While the new Democratic majority in Congress hints at new
energy and climate policies, and many cities have committed to
the Kyoto Protocol goals, the US still has a long road to travel
before it catches the leading green states. 
Conclusions
Currently, fossil fuel production and consumption seems
integral to the economic livelihood of the global community.
After all, these energy sources power a substantial portion of
electricity generation and heating, nearly all automobiles, and a
great deal of worldwide industrial activity. Therefore, they pro-
vide prosperity to innumerable individuals, many giant corpo-
rations and dozens of nation-states. Significantly reducing
either energy demand or fossil fuel consumption will require a
concerted effort unlike any other environmental achievement to
date. Indeed, meeting the challenges posed by global warming
will require extraordinary political effort and will – perhaps the
apt comparison is the collective exertion put forth by the allied
states during the second World War, when the leaders of the
United States and United Kingdom joined the forces under
their respective commands with those of the Soviet Union to
defeat a common and dangerous foe. Halting global warming is
not literally equivalent to war, of course, but it will require
costly and prolonged commitments by diverse and powerful
political actors. Proponents of greener policies will confront
well-entrenched forces that will not yield their economic posi-
tion without a political fight. Enormous barriers must be sur-
mounted for the US alone to make the necessary transforma-
tions – and such progress would necessarily have to be matched
all over the world. The great hope for the planet will, as it did
in the 1940s, rest upon the prospect of a basic common interest
that must become the motivating impetus for collective action.
Scientists warn that the costs and negative consequences will
be devastating if the world does not attempt to meet this chal-
lenge. 
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Back in 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol
was negotiated and the United States agreed
to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) to 7 percent below 1990 levels by
2008-2012, there were high hopes that soon
the U.S. would adopt mandatory programs
to reduce GHG emissions. True, there were
harbingers of doubt – the Clinton adminis-
tration was badly bruised by the fight over
imposing a “BTU tax” early in its tenure and
the Senate passed, by a 97-0 vote the sum-
mer before Kyoto, a resolution that seemed
to disavow the essential principles embodied
in the Kyoto Protocol: that the developed
countries should take action to reduce GHG
emissions before the developing world.
Nevertheless, the U.S. has an impeccable
history of living up to international environ-
mental agreements and the scientific evi-
dence of global warming has only grown
stronger since 1997. Yet, here we are ten
years later with U.S. GHG emissions 16%
above 1990 levels and no national regulation
of carbon.
Since the executive and legislative
branches of the U.S. government have failed
to enact or implement mandatory programs
to reduce U.S. GHG emissions, environmen-
tal groups and many states and localities
have turned to the judicial branch to force
the federal government and industry to
reduce GHG emissions.2 The use of the judi-
cial system to promote good public policy is
not new: for example, school segregation
was challenged in Brown v. Board of
Education, and courts have ordered cigarette
companies to pay millions of dollars in dam-
ages. In the environmental arena, people
have sought relief from the courts to stop
pollution from industry, either when the pol-
lution is inadequately regulated or, as in the
case of GHG emissions, not regulated at all.
The courts are also a venue for compelling
the government to act when people believe
the government is failing to use its existing
authority to protect public health. For exam-
ple, the Natural Resources Defense Council
in the early 1970s sued EPA to regulate lead
content in gasoline and to list lead as a crite-
ria pollutant under the Clean Air Act. 
So it is no surprise to see a phenomenal
growth in climate change litigation in the
past few years. This article discusses some
of the issues raised in the most significant
lawsuits (but it is not intended to be a com-
plete accounting of all litigation). The most
important case by far is the one decided by
the Supreme Court this spring of 2007.
Massachusetts v. EPA: Greenhouse Gases
Are Air Pollutants So Why Doesn’t EPA
Regulate Them Under the Clean Air Act?
The questions presented in
Massachusetts v. EPA3 are whether EPA has
authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate
GHG emissions from motor vehicles and, if
the agency does, did it rely on permissible
grounds in rejecting a petition calling for it
to regulate these emissions. 
The lawsuit stems from a petition filed
back in 1999 asking EPA to regulate GHG
emissions from motor vehicles under section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The
petition asked EPA to regulate these emis-
sions because GHG emissions are air pollu-
tants, as defined under the Act, that “may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health and welfare.”4 EPA denied the peti-
tion in 2003 for two reasons.5 First, it said it
lacked authority to regulate GHG emissions.
This contradicted an opinion issued by
EPA’s general counsel in 19986 that reached
the opposite conclusion. EPA said that glob-
al warming was such an important issue
touching on almost all aspects of life, since
energy production releases GHG emissions
and energy production is integral to econom-
ic development, so, in “the absence of any
direct or even indirect indication that
Congress intended to authorize regulation
under the CAA to address global climate
change, it is unreasonable to conclude that
the CAA provides the Agency with such
authority.”7 It also noted its view that such
regulation would interfere with fuel econo-
my standards set by the Department of
Transportation under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA).  
This is a remarkable position for an
agency to take and belies the agency’s will-
ingness to interpret environmental statutes
expansively in other areas. For example, the
EPA under this administration has found
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authority in the Clean Air Act to set up a national cap-and-trade
scheme for mercury, a toxic air pollutant, even though all other
hazardous air pollutants are instead subject to mandatory source-
by-source reduction requirements. It has also found authority in
the Act to establish a regional cap-and-trade system for sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from power plants in the
eastern half of the U.S., even though such a scheme is not
spelled out in the CAA.8 Granted, one might argue that these
expansive interpretations concern pollutants EPA has already
regulated under the Clean Air Act, not GHGs. However, EPA
liberally interpreted another act – the Safe Drinking Water Act –
to cover underground injection of carbon dioxide (CO2) into
geological formations.9 The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
was passed in 1974 and amended in 1986 and 1996. It strains
credulity to believe that Congress in promulgating the SDWA
contemplated that this law, designed to protect the public’s water
supply, would cover injection of CO2 into geological formations
as part of carbon capture and sequestration strategies to deal
with global warming.
The second reason EPA gave for rejecting the petition was
that, even if it had the authority to regulate GHG emissions
under the Clean Air Act, it refused to exercise this authority for
policy reasons and instead was pursuing the President’s volun-
tary approach of reducing GHG intensity and conducting more
research.
EPA’s decision was challenged in court, resulting in a frac-
tured decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.10 By a 2-1 vote, the court dismissed the petition, but the
judges’ views were all over the map. The judge who wrote the
majority opinion, Raymond Randolph, assumed that EPA had
authority under the CAA to regulate GHG emissions, without
deciding this issue, but said the EPA was within its discretion not
to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles. Judge David
Sentelle concurred with the result of Randolph’s opinion –
upholding EPA’s rejection of the petition – but for an entirely
different reason: he said that the plaintiffs in the suit lacked
standing (more on that below). The third judge in the case,
David Tatel, issued a strong dissent, finding that EPA has author-
ity to regulate, that petitioners do have standing and that EPA
relied on impermissible policy reasons that are not in section
202(a)(1) in rejecting the petition.
The petitioners, which include several states, appealed to
the Supreme Court, which heard oral arguments on November
29, 2006. The majority of the oral argument time was spent on
the question of standing. Standing in essence means, do the peo-
ple who are suing have the right to sue and is the court in a posi-
tion to help resolve the issue? Standing is a way for courts to
manage cases, so that the courts only address issues that direct-
ly impact the person suing (injury in fact) and ones that the
courts are capable of redressing (redressability). In addition, the
injury suffered by the person suing must be traceable to an act of
the defendant (traceability). Each of these three elements was
probed by the justices.11 With respect to redressability, Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia queried
Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General
James Milkey as to whether a decision lead-
ing to a 2.5% reduction in GHG emissions
(the possible impact of regulating GHG emissions from new
U.S. automobiles) would really reduce the impact of global
warming on states’ coastlines. On the other hand, Justices
Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter and John Paul
Stevens seemed troubled by Deputy Solicitor General Gregory
Garre’s implication that harm needed to be “pinpointed mathe-
matically” (i.e., the exact miles of state coastline that will be lost
because of GHGs emitted by cars in the U.S.) to show standing.
Justice Scalia also probed on the issue of timing: is anyone being
harmed now? “When is the predicted cataclysm?” he asked.
Interestingly, the questions directed at what may seem to
non-lawyers to be a sticky procedural issue also happen to be the
same ones that make tackling global warming so tricky. How
much will regulating only new cars/only power plants/only
sources in the U.S./only sources in developed countries really
reduce global warming? Aren’t the worst impacts of global
warming decades away, so no one is really being harmed now,
and if so why should we act now? Shouldn’t we wait until we
have better technological solutions or until we have better scien-
tific information? Who is really responsible for global warming
– power plants, car companies, industry as a whole, countries
(which ones) or do we have only ourselves and our lifestyle
choices to blame?
On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court released its decision.12
By a vote of 5-4, the Court found that the appellants had stand-
ing, that EPA has authority to regulate GHG emissions from new
motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act and that the reasons EPA
gave for not regulating these emissions were “divorced from the
statutory text.”13 The majority opinion was authored by Justice
Stevens and joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy and
Souter.
With respect to standing, interestingly, the majority said that
Massachusetts “is entitled to special solicitude” in the court’s
standing analysis.14 The Court noted that a state, while a sover-
eign power, surrendered certain of these powers when it joined
the Union: “Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force
reductions in [GHGs], it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty
with China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of
its police powers to reduce in-state motor vehicle emissions
might well be pre-empted.”15 The court then concluded that
Massachusetts meets all the tests required by standing:16
Massachusetts owns a substantial portion of coastal property
that has already been harmed by sea level rise caused by global
warming and will be harmed by further sea level rises, “[t]he
risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real
[and this] risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners
received the relief they seek.”17
The Court dismissed several arguments on standing that
deserve mention. The fact that climate change risks are widely
shared, it said, “does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the
outcome of this litigation.”18 A decision otherwise could have
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severely affected the ability of anyone to
sue where there are broad but diffuse
environmental impacts. For example, in a
case in Oregon in 2006 about a company’s
GHG emissions, the company argued that
plaintiffs lacked standing because global
warming will affect everyone, not just the
defendants. The district judge eloquently
rebuffed these arguments: 
“If Defendant’s theory of
standing were correct, no per-
son could have standing to
maintain an action aimed at
averting harm to the Grand
Canyon or Yellowstone
National Park, or threats to
the giant sequoias and blue
whales, as the loss of those
treasures would be felt by
everyone.”19
The court also said that, while EPA’s
regulation of GHG emissions from new
motor vehicles in the U.S. wouldn’t be
enough to reverse global warming, a
reduction in U.S. GHG emissions would
slow the pace of global emissions
increase. (This goes to the issue of
“redressability.”) The Supreme Court
could have decided that, since GHG emis-
sions from new U.S. motor vehicles con-
stitute only 2.5% of worldwide emissions,
regulating these sources is insufficient to
redress the harm to states for global
warming. Then, Massachusetts would
have lacked standing to sue. Such a deci-
sion would have meant that, the more
sources of pollution there are, the harder it
would be to sue any one of them because
a source could always say it is but a small
part of the problem and so is not harming
any one person all that much. Therefore,
no one has standing to sue.
Turning to the merits, the court
strongly criticized EPA’s decision and rea-
soning in refusing to regulate GHG emis-
sions from new motor vehicles. First, it
examined EPA’s argument that GHGs are
not “air pollutants” as defined in the Act.
The Court said the statute contains a
“sweeping definition” of air pollutant that
“embraces all airborne compounds of
whatever stripe,” and CO2 and other
GHGs “without a doubt” fit the statutory
definition of “air pollutant” in the Act.20
Furthermore, the court rejected EPA’s
contention that regulation of CO2 emis-
sions from motor vehicles would require
the agency to tighten fuel efficiency stan-
dards, which falls under the purview of
the Department of Transportation (DOT).
That “DOT sets mileage standards in no
way licenses EPA to shirk its environmen-
tal responsibilities” – the obligations of
the two agencies may overlap, “but there
is no reason to think the two agencies can-
not both administer their obligations and
yet avoid inconsistency.”21
Thus finding that GHGs clearly fall
within the definition of “air pollutant,” the
Court then addressed whether EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting
the petition calling for it to regulate GHG
emissions from new motor vehicles. The
Court found that EPA had so acted. The
CAA gives EPA discretion on regulating,
but that discretion is cabined, the court
said: EPA “must ground its reasons for
action or inaction in the statute.” Instead,
EPA provided “a laundry list of reasons
not to regulate . . . [and] it is evident they
have nothing to do with whether [GHG]
emissions contribute to climate change.”
The court said that if scientific uncertain-
ty on global warming “is so profound it
precludes EPA from making a reasoned
judgment as to whether GHG emissions
contribute to global warming, EPA must
say so.” That EPA prefers not to regulate
because of some “residual uncertainty ...
is irrelevant,” the court said. The court
remanded the matter for further proceed-
ings consistent with its opinion, thus
sending the petition back to EPA for
action.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissent,
joined by the other three dissenters, reject-
ing the case on standing grounds. While
he provided a detailed legal explanation
of his reasoning, in essence his argument
was that this was really a matter for
Congress and the executive branch to
resolve, not the courts. Roberts said there
is a “mismatch” between catastrophic
global warming and the “narrow subject
matter of the Clean Air Act provision at
issue in this suit[, which] suggests that
petitioners’ true goal for this litigation
may be more symbolic than anything
else.”22 Justice Scalia wrote a separate dis-
sent, also joined by the three other dis-
senters, arguing that it was within EPA’s
discretion to defer a decision to regulate
GHG emissions under the Act. (He also
argued that EPA was correct in concluding
that GHGs are not air pollutants and that
enough scientific uncertainty existed
about global warming for EPA to con-
clude that scientific uncertainty is so pro-
found as to preclude EPA from concluding
that GHGs contribute to global warming.)
What are the implications of this
decision?  First, it frees this EPA or a
future EPA to regulate GHG emissions
from any and all sources covered by the
CAA. And, in fact, it does more than that
– it appears to require that EPA make a
decision and not simply defer a decision,
and it sharply limits which reasons the
agency can cite in deciding not to regu-
late.23 The only points of discretion afford-
ed EPA are in determining 1) whether
GHG emissions contribute to global
warming and 2) whether sufficient infor-
mation exists to make a finding that glob-
al warming “may reasonably be anticipat-
ed to endanger public health and welfare,”
as provided in section 202(a)(1). If EPA
concludes that GHG emissions contribute
to climate change and makes a finding of
endangerment,24 then the agency’s only
option appears to be, under the court’s rul-
ing, to regulate GHG emissions from new
motor vehicles.
Second, the ruling that GHGs are air
pollutants as defined in the CAA lifts the
cloud of uncertainty surrounding state
efforts to regulate emissions of air pollu-
tants from new motor vehicles. Under the
CAA section 209(a), only the federal gov-
ernment or California (with a waiver from
EPA) may regulate emissions from air
pollutants from new motor vehicles. (The
rest of the U.S. may choose to either adopt
the California or EPA standards.)
Arguably, if the Supreme Court ruled that
EPA cannot regulate GHG emissions from
motor vehicles under the CAA, no other
jurisdiction in the United States could do
so either because of the restriction in
CAA section 209(a). California in 2004
promulgated regulations limiting GHG
emissions from new cars and light duty
trucks beginning in 2009, and eleven
states25 (in addition to California) have
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adopted these standards, with three states26 actively considering
following suit. These state efforts are being challenged on var-
ious other grounds, which I will describe in more detail below.
Third, the court’s statements about the overlapping obliga-
tions of EPA (under the CAA) and DOT (under the EPCA) may
have implications for cases challenging California’s GHG
emission standards for motor vehicles, described below. One of
the arguments raised is that regulating GHG emissions from
motor vehicles by necessity means increasing fuel efficiency
standards, and so EPA regulation of GHG emissions from
motor vehicles conflicts with DOT’s statutory authorities. The
Supreme Court, however, didn’t see any conflict and in fact
said that EPA couldn’t use this argument to “shirk its environ-
mental responsibilities.”27
Finally, the case expounds further on the Supreme Court’s
views on standing doctrine, in a favorable way for plaintiffs,
which will prove helpful in future environmental cases.
Other Lawsuits Against the Federal Government
There are several other lawsuits wending their way
through courts attempting to either compel the U.S. govern-
ment to explicitly regulate GHG emissions or to take global
warming into account in U.S. government decisions or actions.
These lawsuits include challenges to:
• EPA’s decision, under CAA section 111, not to
establish a new source performance standard
(NSPS) for CO2 emissions from new, modified or
reconstructed power plants28—EPA stated it did not
have authority to “set NSPS to regulate CO2 or
other [GHGs] that contribute to global climate
change;”29
• National gas mileage standards set in 2006 for
light trucks, because the Department of
Transportation failed to consider global climate
change and to consider the overall environmental
impact of GHG emissions from light trucks;30
• Investment decisions of the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and the Export-Import
Bank because they failed to conduct any assess-
ment of the impact on global warming of the loans
and financial guarantees they have made for proj-
ects resulting in GHG emissions, including oil and
gas fields, pipelines, oil refineries and power
plants;31 and
• Regulations that allow the oil and gas industry to
incidentally take polar bears and walruses while
engaging in activities in the Arctic, because the
Department of the Interior allegedly failed to con-
sider the impact that global warming, in addition
to oil and gas exploration activities, will have on
these species.32
The Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts will have
the most direct impact on the first case, since EPA can no
longer argue that it lacks authority to regu-
late GHG emissions under the CAA.
However, setting a CO2 NSPS is hardly
straightforward. For example, for coal, would integrated gasifi-
cation combined cycle (IGCC) technology be considered the
“best demonstrated technology,”33 even though it could be, as
several power plant companies have argued, considered a
wholly different form of generating electricity and so is chang-
ing the character of the project from one that burns coal to one
that gasifies it instead? IGCC’s full benefits aren’t realized
unless the carbon is sequestered, so would sequestration be an
element of the NSPS? Technologies are being developed to
capture CO2 from traditional pulverized coal plants, but they
are evolving and much more costly currently than IGCC.34 Stay
tuned.
Environmental groups and others have also sought to com-
pel the federal government to:
• list the polar bear as an threatened or endangered
species under the Endangered Species Act because
global warming is imperiling the polar bears’ habi-
tat;35 and
• produce a new National Assessment of Climate
Change Impacts on the United States; the last
assessment was released in 1999 and by law one is
supposed to be produced every four years.36
Lawsuits Against Companies
The two largest sources of GHG emissions in the United
States are the electric utility sector and the transportation sec-
tor,37 and organizations have pursued lawsuits against utility
and car companies. These suits raise complex legal, policy and
political considerations. How can one attribute the harms of
global warming to any one company, group of companies or
any industrial sector, when global warming is a global pollution
problem with impacts diverse and diffuse? Are the courts the
right arena for this kind of policymaking, or are the issues bet-
ter resolved by the legislative branch, which can weigh com-
peting concerns and pass comprehensive or targeted legislation
as needed? A court can only deal with the parties in front of it;
a legislature has the entire suite of U.S. emitters to address.
What kind of remedy could a court fashion that would have any
impact? On the other hand, if the legislature has failed to act or
not fully addressed global warming, the courts may be the
forum of last resort to effect a reduction in GHG emissions.
The issue of the appropriateness of this type of lawsuit
came up in the first litigation of this kind, where a coalition of
eight states, New York City and several conservation and pub-
lic land trusts sought a court order to force the five largest U.S.
electric utilities to cut their GHG emissions.38 A federal district
court held that the regulation of CO2 was a political question
not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  (This case is
on appeal.)
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Automakers hope for a similar result
in a case in California, where California
filed suit against six major auto manufac-
turers alleging that emissions from their
vehicles “have contributed significantly to
global warming, harmed the resources,
infrastructure and environmental health of
California, and cost the state millions of
dollars to address current and future
effects.”39 California seeks monetary dam-
ages for past and ongoing contributions to
global warming and a declaratory judg-
ment that the defendants, jointly and sev-
erally, are liable for future monetary dam-
ages to California caused by the defen-
dants’ past and ongoing contributions to
global warming. Automakers filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing inter alia that
the lawsuit raised nonjusticiable political
issues and that the suit is preempted by
the Clean Air Act and EPCA.40 During
oral argument, the auto companies said
the courts are the wrong venue for such a
complex issue and that California’s action
could interfere with U.S. negotiations on
global warming with other countries, so
the court should dismiss the case.41
Hurricane Katrina engendered multi-
ple lawsuits, including one seeking to tie
the severe damage of the hurricane to
companies’ GHG emissions. Owners of
property damaged by the hurricane filed a
lawsuit against their insurance companies
and included three chemical companies as
defendants, alleging that the damages
they sustained during the hurricane were
partly as a result of the companies’ GHG
emissions.42 Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint on April 19, 2006, asking for
class action status to sue oil, chemical and
coal companies, alleging that these com-
panies’ GHG emissions have increased
the frequency and severity of hurricanes. 
It seems difficult to tie any particular
damage, even damage to all the homes
affected by Hurricane Katrina, to
increased severity of storms caused by
global warming, even if one could tie a
percentage of the global warming experi-
enced to date to companies’ past GHG
emissions. In the past “market share lia-
bility” theories have been used to resolve
similar types of cases, where a product
produced by several or many companies
is admittedly harmful, but it is difficult to
link the product of any particular compa-
ny with the specific harm suffered by a
particular individual. For example, in a
class action case involving ten manufac-
turers of diethylstilbestrol (DES), the
California Supreme Court agreed with
apportioning liability based on the market
share of companies – company Y with
Y% of market share was liable for Y% of
all the damages suffered by people using
the company’s product, and company X
with X% of market share was liable for
X% of the damages, etc.43 But even if a
court were to accept market share liabili-
ty, the court may still require that plain-
tiffs to tie the increased severity of
Hurricane Katrina directly to global
warming, and the author is not aware of




Thus far I have discussed litigation
dealing with failures of the federal gov-
ernment and companies to address global
warming. Now I will turn to litigation
challenging state regulations aimed at
reducing GHG emissions.
As noted above, California adopted
GHG emission standards for passenger
vehicles, including SUVs, which go into
effect for Model Year 2009 vehicles, and
more than a dozen states are either adopt-
ing or considering adopting the California
standards. Several lawsuits have been
filed in different states challenging these
GHG emission standards for motor vehi-
cles.44
The case directly addressing the
California regulations (as opposed to the
adoption by another state of the California
standards) is Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep
v. Witherspoon. The judge in September
2006 made an initial ruling throwing out
two of the claims45 but finding that three
other claims had a sufficient basis to go
forward: that California’s standards are
preempted by the CAA, EPCA and U.S.
foreign policy. 
With respect to the CAA, because
EPA has not yet granted the waiver
required under section 209(b), Judge
Anthony Ishii said he could not dismiss
this claim.46 With respect to EPCA, the
automobile industry claimed that the
California standards are preempted by
EPCA because they are related to fuel
economy, and by passing EPCA,
Congress preempted any state from set-
ting standards related to fuel economy.
The industry also argued that EPCA pro-
vides for other objectives, such as ensur-
ing the economic vitality of the automo-
bile industry, that could be frustrated if
states set standards that would require
more fuel-efficient cars. California
responded, in part, that because the CAA
allows the state to set air pollution emis-
sion standards, and those standards may
have an impact on fuel economy, this evi-
denced Congressional intent to allow
California to set the GHG emission stan-
dards. Judge Ishii found that there was
nothing before him that “evinces
Congress’ intent to permit California reg-
ulations that stand as an obstacle to
EPCA’s objectives,” so the EPCA pre-
emption claim could move forward.47 The
Supreme Court opinion in Massachusetts
v. EPA, however, weakens the industry’s
EPCA argument.48
Neither of these decisions is surpris-
ing; however, Judge Ishii’s decision not to
throw out the foreign policy conflict claim
is troubling. The automobile industry
argued that California’s regulation “inter-
feres with the ability of the United States
to speak with one voice upon matters of
global climate change and diminishes the
bargaining power of the United States in
negotiating multilateral reductions” of
GHGs.49 Judge Ishii said that the “absence
of a statute or executive agreement is not
fatal to a foreign policy preemption
claim.”50 This is disquieting, since it
would prevent states from acting on a sub-
ject matter covered or addressed in any
parleys between the federal government
and foreign nations even if there is no
international or national agreement (like
a treaty or law) memorializing U.S. poli-
cy. Ishii concluded that, since the execu-
tive branch’s preferred policy approach
was to negotiate with other nations to
reach agreements regarding GHG emis-
sions reductions,51 and the plaintiffs allege
that the California regulations undercut
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this strategy, there is a basis for the auto-
mobile industry’s claim of foreign policy
preemption.52 Let’s consider the ramifica-
tions if this proves to be a winning argu-
ment. If the U.S. federal government is
discussing any environmental issue in the
international arena, a state is preempted
from acting on that particular issue if such
action could conceivably interfere with
these discussions? This could tie states’
hands in all manners of environmental
regulation. More specifically, does it
mean that no state can regulate GHG
emissions at all, as California, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Oregon and
Washington have done with respect to
power plant emissions? Renewable port-
folio standards (RPS) increase the amount
of renewable energy generated, which
decreases GHG emissions since renew-
able energy emits little or no GHG emis-
sions. Does it mean a state cannot even set
a RPS, as 23 states and the District
Columbia have done?53 Granted, Judge
Ishii’s decision was only that this claim
could leap the first hurdle and go to trial,
and one hopes that this is as far as it goes.
Judge Ishii stayed further proceeding in
this case on January 16, 2007, pending the
outcome in Massachusetts v. EPA.54
Interestingly, a judge in Vermont
decided not to stay proceedings in a case
where the automobile industry sued the
state of Vermont for adopting California’s
standards. Judge William Sessions III said
that the case is sure to be appealed, and the
appellate court “rightfully should be able to
review a ‘complete’ record of ... ‘an extraor-
dinary case.’”55 Following the Supreme
Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the
judge held a hearing to determine whether
the case should still move forward. Those
defending the Vermont standards argued
that the Supreme Court case meant the
California standards were valid, but the
automakers said the Court decision did not
settle the EPCA preemption claim. Judge
Sessions decided to proceed to trial without
ruling on any of the main legal issues, say-
ing that this was such an important case he
wanted to hear all the evidence before
deciding the outcome.56 The trial in Green
Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v.
Crombie began April 10, 2007.
A Peek Into the Future
The Supreme Court decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA has provided some
helpful guidance on what can be done
under the Clean Air Act to regulate GHG
emissions, including making it more like-
ly that the California GHG emission stan-
dards for new motor vehicles will with-
stand legal challenges. And hopefully
claims that state or local regulation of
GHG emissions is preempted by foreign
policy considerations will be rebuffed, so
that states and localities may continue
their leadership role on global warming.
There is another titanic legal issue
around the corner, though: to what extent
can states cooperate in regulating GHG
emissions? In 2009 ten states57 will launch
a regional cap-and-trade program cover-
ing CO2 emissions from power plants in
the region. Watch for claims that this
regional agreement interferes with inter-
state commerce or is otherwise unconsti-
tutional and that it is preempted for for-
eign policy reasons. Other regional
actions that may be the subject of lawsuits
are the Western Regional Climate Action
Initiative, in which Arizona, California,
New Mexico, Oregon and Washington
have agreed to set a regional GHG reduc-
tion target and devise a market-based pro-
gram to meet that target,58 and a multi-
state GHG registry launched by 30 states
this spring.59
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Introduction
In recent years, multiple efforts
have emerged across the U.S. to
design and implement greenhouse
gas (GHG) registry systems. GHG
registries are being developed on
several geographical levels – state,
regional, and national – and are
being designed to support different
objectives, such as voluntary corpo-
rate reporting, state/regional-level
GHG regulatory systems, and track-
ing progress towards a national vol-
untary GHG intensity target.
With all of this activity on GHG
registries in the U.S., there are
important questions to be addressed.
What type of GHG registry system
does the U.S. need to support effec-
tive U.S. action to address climate
change?  Is one national registry sys-
tem preferred to multiple state or
regional-level registries?  How
should such a registry be designed?    
This paper aims to cut through
the clutter on GHG registries in the
U.S.  It provides a general overview
of GHG registries, evaluates the need
for a U.S. registry system, and offers
a brief description of existing and
emerging GHG registries and report-
ing programs in the U.S. It then dis-
cusses, based on the World
Resources Institute’s (WRI) experi-
ence in GHG accounting, reporting
and registry development, what a
U.S. registry system would look like
to support effective U.S. climate
action.  This paper aims to provide
insights to help state and federal pol-
icy makers, businesses, environmen-
tal advocates, and other interested
stakeholders better understand key
building blocks of GHG registries
and their function as the U.S. begins
to take action on climate change. 
GHG Registries: What and Why?
A GHG registry is a system or
database that receives and stores
GHG emissions data. GHG registries
generally follow a bottom-up
approach, where entities (e.g., facili-
ties, companies, municipalities, uni-
versities, non-profit organizations,
etc.) quantify their emissions from
various individual sources and report
this data to the registry.  GHG reg-
istries can collect emissions data at
various levels, including at the
unit/source, the facility, or corporate
or organization-wide.
Emissions data held by a reg-
istry is generally based on a series of
GHG accounting and reporting stan-
dards, or a set of commonly accepted
concepts and terminologies, within
an agreed framework that, collective-
ly, establish a true and fair account of
GHG emissions.  One widely used
model is the GHG Protocol Initiative
(see Box 1).
Current Status of GHG Registry
and Programs in the U.S.
There is an active and wide-
spread effort to develop GHG reg-
istry and reporting programs in the
U.S (see Box 2).  Most of these reg-
istries and programs have emerged
within the past five years.  
At the Federal level, while sev-
eral emissions registries track data on
CO2 emissions, only one – the
DOE’s 1605(b) registry – is designed
to focus on GHG emissions. A sec-
ond, the EPA Climate Leaders
Program, focuses on providing a reg-
istry to record voluntary emissions
reduction efforts by corporations that
are part of the Climate Leaders
Initiative.
At the state and regional level,
the most established registry system
is the California Climate Action
Registry (CCAR), which has been in
operation since 2002. All of the other
regional-based registries listed in
Box 2 are either still under develop-
ment or in the very preliminary
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stages of consideration. One very recent new regional system
being developed is “The Climate Registry”, a collaboration of
more than 30 states seeking to create a unified GHG reporting
and accounting platform in the U.S. 
In addition, one private sector registry has been developed.
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), which in 2003
launched a voluntary emissions trading platform, set up a reg-
istry to record corporate performance within the exchange. 
Key Elements and Characteristics of a U.S. GHG Registry
Given all of this activity on GHG programs (and attendant
registries), it is worthwhile to examine what type of GHG reg-
istry system the U.S. needs to support effective action to
address climate change.  
Establish a single national registry
While the current GHG registry situation features multiple
state, regional, and national-level systems, it is clear that a
national “patchwork” of multiple registry systems is both over-
ly complex and inefficient.  A single (well-designed) national
registry system would ensure consistency in GHG accounting
and reporting and standardize best practices, and would help
facilitate linkages between various types of GHG programs that
may use the registry. A single system would also ease the bur-
den on companies, which want to voluntarily report emissions
by eliminating multiple reporting requirements.  
Ensure the consistent reporting of absolute emissions and
reductions over time
To support effective U.S. action on climate change, a
national registry should track emissions and reductions based
on absolute emissions, not intensity metrics. Intensity measure-
ments can be valuable as performance indicators that are inde-
pendent of company growth, and can provide helpful bench-
marks for achieving emission reductions. However, in order to
have a mechanism that monitors overall environmental effec-
tiveness, a registry needs to be couched in the context of trans-
parent and consistent reporting of absolute emissions over
time. This will allow the clear and transparent monitoring of
overall progress in achieving real reductions.  
Follow internationally accepted GHG accounting standards
and methodologies
A national U.S. registry system should not “reinvent the
wheel” and should adopt credible, broadly accepted and wide-
ly used accounting and reporting standards and quantification
methodologies, such as those featured in the GHG Protocol and
the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines,
and recently adopted by the International Standards
Organization (ISO). Adopting best practice GHG standards and
methodologies would ensure environmental credibility, enable
a U.S. registry system and its associated GHG policies or pro-
grams to link with other sub-national, national, or international
registries and policies; and simplify business participation for
companies already following best practice methodologies.
Incorporate five key GHG Protocol accounting and reporting
principles
A U.S. registry should require reporting entities to account,
report, and verify their GHG emissions according to the fol-
lowing five principles, based on established financial account-
ing and reporting practices. This will ensure expectations are
clearly set to promote the highest possible degree of rigor and
credibility of the reported information.  
BOX 1. The GHG Protocol
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol is a multi-stakeholder partner-
ship of businesses, NGOs, governments, and others led by WRI
and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development
(WBCSD). The GHG Protocol provides the accounting frame-
work for nearly every GHG standard and program in the world
– from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
to the World Economic Forum GHG Register – as well as hun-
dreds of GHG inventories prepared by individual companies.
In the U.S., key initiatives based on the GHG Protocol include
the U.S. EPA Climate Leaders Program and the California
Climate Action Registry. In addition, the EU Emissions
Trading System uses quantification methodologies provided by
the GHG Protocol and refers to the Protocol as one of the three
main sources that guided the design of its Monitoring &
Reporting Guidelines (MRG) published in 2006.
A GHG standard or methodology such as the GHG Protocol
Corporate Standard provides a measurement and reporting
framework for a GHG registry. A GHG registry and the stan-
dards on which a registry is based, together serve as the emis-
sions accounting and reporting foundation for various types of
GHG policies, programs or other initiatives. While the specific
design of a registry (and its underlying measurement and
reporting framework) is a function of the targeted GHG pro-
gram objectives, the GHG standards themselves are usually
policy and program neutral, allowing them to be integrated in
these design choices. 
For instance, emissions estimates from individual sources
reported to a registry can be used for regulatory purposes,
where individual sources or facilities face emission restrictions.
For such regulatory policies, registries provide a common data-
base for mandatory emissions reporting and can also track
emission reductions and support design and operation of an
emissions and allowance trading system. 
Emissions estimates from individual sources can also be con-
solidated or “rolled-up” to the organization level to support
voluntary reporting, where companies and other entities inven-
tory their organization-wide emissions on a year-to-year basis
and track progress towards emission reduction targets.
Registries can support corporate GHG management efforts by
providing credibility and validation to a company’s emissions
data, and in certain situations may be able to serve as a mech-
anism for an entity to protect its baseline or get “early action
credit” in future regulatory schemes. Most registries also serve
as a public window into the GHG emissions of reporting enti-
ties, as they make data transparently available.
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U.S. Federal Government GHG
Registry Systems
U.S. DOE Voluntary Greenhouse Gas
Reporting Program [1605(b)]:  The fed-
eral government’s GHG registry system
that consists of a public reporting plat-
form. The registry was originally estab-
lished in 1994, but has undergone sever-
al rounds of revisions, with the most
recent guidelines being released in April
2006. The registry tracks emission
reductions made by individual entities,
based on intensity metrics. 
U.S. EPA Clean Air Markets Data and
Maps:  Designed to register data related
to the Acid Rain Program and the NOx
Budget Trading Program, this registry
also contains CO2 emissions data for
over 3,500 electricity generating units
covered under the Acid Rain Program. 
U.S. EPA Emissions & Generation
Resource Integrated Database
(eGRID):  An online database for data
related to electric power generated in
the U.S., eGRID also contains CO2
emissions data on more than 4,700 U.S.
power plants and nearly 2,000 electrici-
ty generating companies.
U.S. State and Regional GHG
Registry Systems
California Climate Action Registry:  A
voluntary GHG registry created by
California legislation, which has been in
operation since 2002.  Over 85 organi-
zations including companies, cities,
government agencies, and NGOs pub-
licly report their GHG emissions
through the Registry.
Eastern Climate Registry (ECR):  Ten
states in the eastern U.S., including
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont, coordinat-
ed by NESCAUM, are in the final
stages of developing a GHG registry.
Other State/Regional Registry
Initiatives:  Eight Midwest States, coor-
dinated by the Lake Michigan Air
Directors Consortium (LADCO), have
been exploring the development of a
regional GHG Registry, as have 13
Western states, coordinated by the
Western Regional Air Partnership
(WRAP).
The Climate Registry (TCR):  An
emerging collaboration of U.S. states
and tribes working together to create a
unified GHG reporting and accounting
platform in the U.S.  About 30 states are
involved in development and design of
the TCR, including the states from the
four U.S. state and regional GHG reg-
istry efforts described above (CCAR,
ECR, LADCO, & WRAP), and several
states from other U.S. regions (e.g.,
Southeast).  
Other Relevant GHG Programs and
Climate Initiatives
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: A
partnership among nine Northeastern
States (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and
Vermont), to establish an emissions
trading program within the electricity
generation sector.  The states have com-
mitted to stabilizing emissions at base
levels by 2014, and reducing emissions
by 10% by 2020. The group is still in
the process of developing a registry (the
Regional Greenhouse Gas registry,
RGGR, sometimes referred to as the
Eastern Climate Registry). 
U.S. EPA Climate Leaders Program:  A
voluntary partnership that works with
companies to develop and implement
GHG management strategies. Climate
Leaders partners set a corporate-wide
GHG reduction goal and inventory their
emissions to measure progress, and fol-
low EPA-specified GHG accounting
and reporting procedures, which are
based on the WRI/WBCSD GHG
Protocol. The EPA Climate Leaders pro-
gram does not function as a public
reporting platform for GHG emissions. 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX):  An
independent, for-profit, voluntary GHG
emissions and allowance trading pro-
gram. CCX members make a voluntary,
but legally binding commitment to
reduce GHG emissions by certain lev-
els. The CCX has specified GHG
accounting and reporting procedures,
which are based in-part on the
WRI/WBCSD GHG Protocol. The
CCX does not function as a public
reporting platform for GHG emissions.
Western Regional Climate Action
Initiative (WRCAI):  Announced in
February 2007, WRCAI brings together
Arizona, California, New Mexico,
Oregon and Washington in an effort to:
establish a regional greenhouse gas
emission reductions target by August
2007; and design a joint market-based
emissions reduction mechanism, such
as a cap and trade system, by August
2008.
US Climate Action Partnership
(USCAP): Launched in January 2007,
USCAP is a business and NGO partner-
ship calling for “prompt enactment of
national legislation in the United States
to slow, stop and reverse the growth of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over
the shortest period of time reasonably
achievable.” Founding USCAP mem-
bers include Alcoa, BP America Inc.,
Caterpillar Inc., Duke Energy, DuPont,
Environmental Defense, FPL Group,
General Electric, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, PG&E Corporation,
PNM Resources, and World Resources
Institute. A primary recommendation of
USCAP is the establishment of an
“economy-wide, market-driven
approach that includes a cap and trade
program that places specified limits on
GHG emissions.” 
Box 2. Existing and Emerging U.S. Registries and Programs
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• Relevance – Ensure the GHG inventory appropri-
ately reflects the GHG emissions of the reporting
entity and serves the decision-making needs of
users – both internal and external to the reporting
entity.
• Completeness – Account for and report on all
GHG emission sources and activities within the
chosen inventory boundary. Disclose and justify
any specific exclusions.
• Consistency – Use consistent methodologies to
allow for meaningful comparisons of emissions
over time. Transparently document any changes to
the data, inventory boundary, methods, or any
other relevant factors in the time series.
• Transparency – Address all relevant issues in a
factual and coherent manner, based on a clear audit
trail. Disclose any relevant assumptions and make
appropriate references to the accounting and calcu-
lation methodologies and data sources used.
• Accuracy – Ensure that the quantification of GHG
emissions is systematically neither over nor under
actual emissions, as far as can be judged, and that
uncertainties are reduced as far as practicable.
Achieve sufficient accuracy to enable users to
make decisions with reasonable assurance as to the
integrity of the reported information.
Require public reporting of entity-wide emissions data, broken
down to the unit or facility-level
To design a registry that can support the requirements of a
future GHG regulatory scheme (and possibly other GHG initia-
tives), it will be necessary for entities to report entity-wide
emissions data at the greatest level of granularity – at the unit-
level or at least the facility-level.  Most if not all existing cap
and trade programs, including the U.S. Acid Rain Program,
U.S. NOx Budget Trading Program, the Northeast States
regional GHG Initiative and the E.U. Emissions Trading
System, regulate at the unit or facility-level.  The reporting of
unit or facility-level emissions data would enable a registry
system to “roll-up” emissions to the company-level, which is
important for corporate GHG management efforts (a significant
potential value added). Emissions reported at the unit or facili-
ty-level can also be rolled-up to the state, regional, or sectoral-
level, so a registry that requires unit or facility-level emissions
reporting can serve as a foundation for multiple types of GHG
policies and programs, including those that are either multi-
sectoral or sector-specific; mandatory or voluntary; or national-
level or state/regional-level.
Provide a clear and adequate distinction between entity-level
and project-level GHG accounting
To be credible and ensure environmental integrity, a U.S.
registry system must distinguish between the two types of
GHG accounting – entity-level and project-level (often referred
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Box 3: Entity vs. Project Accounting
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commonly used to measure emissions from entities that are
regulated as part of a cap and trade program and to measure
organization-wide emissions of companies through a corporate
GHG inventory.  In entity-level accounting, a company or other
entity measures its reductions in GHG emissions by comparing
current year emissions against historical “base year” emissions.  
Project accounting is most commonly used to measure
reductions from unique GHG mitigation projects or offsets that
occur outside the reporting boundary of sources covered under
a cap and trade system or an entity’s GHG inventory.  In proj-
ect accounting, GHG reductions are calculated against a hypo-
thetical “baseline”. Project offsets are commonly defined as the
emissions that would have occurred had the GHG mitigation
project not been implemented. It is important that any project-
level or offset methodologies incorporated into a national U.S.
registry ensure that reductions are environmentally additional,
verifiable, permanent, and enforceable – an often difficult cal-
culation that has led to many regimes limiting their acceptance
of such projects.  
Under emerging domestic and international approaches to
emissions accounting, reductions against these different types
of reference points are subject to very different considerations
and requirements.  
Conclusion
There is a clear need for a credible national GHG registry
system capable of supporting effective U.S. action on climate
change. The successes and failures in developing and imple-
menting registries in the last decade by various initiatives pro-
vide a rich source of information and experience that should be
used to inform the design of a national registry. 
Such a system must meet a set of minimum standards to be
both environmentally acceptable, and to ensure that sound
business practices can be built around registry reports. Meeting
this need and challenge will be possible through a registry
design that: 
i. tracks absolute emissions and reductions over
time; 
ii. requires public reporting of entity-level emissions
data, broken down (at a minimum) to the facility
level; 
iv. ensures separation between entity and project level
accounting; 
v. uses widely accepted and internationally recog-
nized GHG accounting principles; and 
v. follows international standards and best practices





With the onset of a widely recognized increase in global
temperature the world’s glaciers and ice sheets have responded
by melting and retreat. This observed recession is particularly
pronounced for glaciers that survive in the tropics and mid-lat-
itudes where, in many cases they serve as long-term and sea-
sonal water storage repositories. In addition, archived in the
stratigraphy of glacial ice is a climate record that has provided
a detailed understanding of the magnitudes and timing of past
climate changes. The need for continued monitoring of the
world’s glaciers and ice sheets and the recovery of ice cores is
becoming increasingly important, for as these glaciers melt, the
high resolution records they contain are being lost. 
Generalities
Global climate change and its consequences for the plane-
tary biosphere has perhaps become the most visible of contem-
porary environmental and social issues. While current debate is
typically focused under the rubric of “global warming”, it
should be reiterated that this is in effect one possible state or
direction of global environmental change. Having been in the
forefront of discussion in scientific and political circles for
some time, discourse connected to global change has increas-
ingly moved away from the supposition that such changes are
not real or inconsequential to wide agreement that indeed such
changes are real and observable. Discussion is now, more than
ever, focused on the possible causation of climate change,
observed and potential impacts and strategies (both adaptive
and mitigative) necessary to accommodate these large scale
environmental shifts. Such commentaries, however, have yet to
establish common and definitive ground and debate often con-
tinues to the point of acrimony and dispute (Monastersky 2003;
Flannery 2005). 
Regardless of the causal agents, it is certainly evident that
such change is consequential from a human and environmental
perspective. The recent plethora of literature related to global
environmental change has now extended well beyond those
publications to be found in the so-called scientific journals to a
broad spectrum of readable literature now readily available to
the general public. Such publications range from the multiple
technical and compound details of climate change processes
(Houghton et al, 2001; Lovejoy and Hannah, 2006) to the
impact of climate change on the human, environmental and
political landscape (e.g. Flannery, 2005; Nash, 2002; Beder,
1997) to those that form a more readable base to a casual and
informed public (e.g. Lynas, 2004; Dressler and Parson, 2006). 
It is also important to note that research related to climate
change is not a new arena of academic thought nor should it be
considered a recent environmental concern. Since the early
1800’s glaciers in the European Alps were observed in a state
of retreat, and in fact, it was through observation of these
retreating glaciers that Louis Agassiz (1807-1873) postulated
his theory of ice ages and so connected the dynamics of gla-
ciers to climate.  By the early to mid-1900’s, a shift in thought
as to the potential for a human-based (anthropogenic) influence
on the Earth’s climate system began to emerge as the impact of
the industrial revolution was realized (e.g. Callendar 1938;
1949). In a very notable series of papers, Plass (1956; 1959)
laid the foundations for understanding the relationships
between changes in atmospheric composition and possible
anthropogenic forcing. His studies on carbon dioxide (CO2)
variability and its role as a greenhouse gas remains as founda-
tional research in the global warming debate. With increasing
awareness of the complexities of the global climate system and
its linkages to all other elements of the physical and human
environment, attention was soon focused on the causation, geo-
graphical distribution, and impact of global climate change
(Revelle and Suess, 1957; Broecker 1965; 1975; Mercer 1968;
1978).
The emerging picture as to the mechanics and conse-
quences of global climate change is one that has found conver-
gence from a diversity of independent scientific fields and a
great variety of analytical techniques. The interpretation of cli-
matic changes and events interpreted through proxy evidence
such as tree rings, coral isotope records, ice cores, pollen analy-
sis, marine sediments, to name a few, has factored into the con-
struction of a coherent picture of the global climate and the
changes that have taken place over various time scales (see for
example, Bradley, 1999). In terms of areal or geographic stud-
ies such research is, of course, not solely focused on the glob-
al scale but has a fine tradition of connections at the regional
level and down to the local scale (Greenland, 2001; Mountain
et al, 2001; Offerle et al, 2007). Furthermore, climate variabil-
ity and change as connected to other climate responsive phe-
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nomena, including the timing and patterns
of human occupancy, has now become a
familiar focus in a constantly evolving lit-
erature base (Shimada et al, 1991;
Thompson et al, 1988. Fagan 1999;
Bradley et al, 2003; Diamond, 2005; Wei
et al, 2007).  
Where Glaciers Fit in
Of the multiple techniques developed
and applied to unravel the global climate,
ice cores recovered from the world’s gla-
ciers have perhaps proven the most reli-
able and information rich. Glaciers are
global in extent surviving in the tropics,
mid latitudes and the polar regions, with
the great ice masses of Greenland and the
Antarctic Continent the last of the
Pleistocene ice sheets (see Figure 1).
Perhaps one of the more utilitarian aspects
of glacial analyses is that the mechanics
of formation and their environmental
response as we see them today are exact-
ly the same as processes that led to their
development in the past. That is, they are
true modern-day analogs. While the fre-
quency, intensity, and spatial (geographic)
distribution of phenomena leading to their
formation (or demise) may have altered,
the physics of these processes cannot
change and remain consistent with the
fundamental laws accepted as governing
our natural environ-
ment (i.e. the precipi-
tation process, the
transition from snow
to glacial ice, the
internal deformation-
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that they respond to
shifts in the energetics of the Earth-atmos-
phere system at all temporal (time) and
spaial scales. In addition, by the very
nature of their formation, they evolve as a
remarkably precise and efficient storage
environment in which an archive of past
climate is well preserved. As such the
connections between the presence of gla-
cial ice on the surface of the Earth, its spa-
tial extent, and the dynamics of glacial
response in continually adjusting to the
variations in the climate system (both
long- and short-term) has become a focal
point of environmental analyses – particu-
larly with respect to global warming
(Arendt et al, 2002; Gerbaux, 2005). 
Glaciers and ice masses can be
viewed as dynamic systems that respond
to a definable set of inputs and respond
through a set of equally definable outputs.
In the simplest of relationships, glaciers
connect to the climate of the time by accu-
mulating and expanding when the temper-
ature lowers (or precipitation increases),
or by melting or ablating when the air
temperature increases (or precipitation
diminishes). A third possibility exists in
the event that there is, over time, a stabil-
ity or permanence in the climate (with
only temperature and precipitation fac-
tored in here) such that the inputs to this
system are balanced with the system out-
put. In this case the glacier will exhibit
neither expansion or retreat and the result-
ing fixed position reflects a state of cli-
matic equilibrium or stability. 
With only a few exceptions, glaciers
worldwide are today experiencing mass
loss and are retreating, many very rapidly,
indicating an adjustment to a climatic
regime different from that responsible for
their formation. For the most part this
retreat or adjustment is attributed to an
overall increase in atmospheric tempera-
ture, but there are cases where such retreat
is a function of changes in regional pre-
cipitation patterns (Molg and Hardy,
2004). Perhaps one of the most critical
issues lies in the observation that many
glaciers are exhibiting a recessional
response much more rapid than might
have been predicted. This does open the
possibility that climate shifts occur more
rapidly and with magnitudes greater than
previously considered. This appears to be
the case even for the larger ice sheets
which could well be expected to have a
relatively slow response or adjustment
period to swings in climate (Alley, 2000;
Stieg and Alley, 2002; Turner et al, 2007).
Furthermore, this observation of rapid cli-
mate change is supported by evidence
well outside of the glacial or periglacial
environment (Altmann, 2002). 
Figure 1. The distribution of mid-latitude and tropical glaciers from which ice cores have been recov-
ered for climate reconstruction. All of these glaciers and ice sheets are characterized by melting and
are in state of recession – some as many as 50 meters a year. The multiple drill sites on Greenland
and in the Antarctic have not been included. Information compiled from these sites has provided a
comprehensive and detailed picture of current and past global climate change. 
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Ice Cores: How to Get Your Own!
The extraction of ice cores is any-
thing but a straightforward process.
Unlike the drilling of a standard solid geo-
logic (bedrock) core, ice drills are
required to perform and be successful in a
complex and difficult environment.
Consider that the temperature of the ice is
often well below zero, the glacier is plas-
tic and characterized by internal motion
(flow), and at depth the ice is under
extreme pressure where some of the diffi-
culties emerge. Furthermore, the glacier
environment is physically demanding, the
ice core cannot be contaminated by either
the drilling system or by human touch, it
needs to be shielded and isolated from its
new (surface) environment, has to remain
frozen for transportation to the laboratory
setting, often from very remote areas, and
is quite fragile. 
Depending upon the drilling location,
ice depth and logistical support, the con-
figuration of ice drills vary. For the deep
drilling projects typical of Antarctica or
Greenland, the system can be quite mas-
sive, require multiple operators and
necessitates considerable logistical sup-
port (typically ski-equipped aircraft or
oversnow vehicles. See Figure 2). For
higher altitude, smaller glaciers typical of
the middle to low latitudes, very small
portable lightweight systems designed to
recover cores to depths 100 to 500 meters
are now commonly used (Zagorodnov et
al, 2005). Drilling systems such as these
(see front cover) are designed to be com-
pletely dismantled and reassembled in the
field. Weight for individual components is
kept to a minimum as is compo-
nent size. These environments
require that the drill be transport-
ed to the site by pack animal or
through human labor (See Figure
3). 
However, for both the shal-
low and deep drilling environ-
ments the mechanics of ice core
recovery remain essentially the
same. The drill is mounted on a
flexible cable through which an
electric current can be passed.
The drill motor is mounted on the
drill barrel and the entire system
is lowered into the drill hole. As
the drill and the cutting head
works its way downward, a hole
approximately 10 centimeters in
diameter is cut. As the drill
rotates, the cutting teeth remove the outer
centimeter of the ice leaving a “pillar”of
ice over which the hollow sleeve of the
drill barrel passes. The drill barrel is
designed to accommodate up to a meter or
so of ice and when the drill cannot travel
further downward it is returned to the sur-
face by the electrically driven winch that
rewinds the cable. In the initial upward
movement of the drill a set of cutting teeth
inside the drill barrel effectively break the
ice core at its base leaving it trapped with-
in the drill barrel. Once at the surface, the
core is removed from the drill, cata-
logued, packaged in sterile plastic sleeves
and containerized for removal from the
research site. In this way the ice core is
recovered essentially meter by meter
through the entire depth of the glacier. 
When Details Count:





in ice cores has provid-
ed great insight into
climate dynamics of





recovered cores are a
precipitation record for
the ice cap (i.e. region-
al climate), a history of
ambient air temperature (reconstructed
through oxygen isotope analyses), non-
soluble particles such as dust, volcanic
ash and pollen (allowing for measures of
past atmospheric turbidity, wind direction,
evidence of volcanic sequences, transi-
tions in local vegetation), and the compo-
sition of earlier atmospheres through
changes in the relative abundances of
trace gasses (carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxides). On a larger scale, transi-
tions in atmospheric circulation phenome-
na such as El Niño, La Niña, the equatori-
al Walker Circulation and their connection
to the global scale Southern Oscillation
(atmospheric pressure) patterns are
detectable in many of the tropical and
mid-latitude ice core records (Thompson
et al, 1984).
The length of such climate records
depends upon the physical environment in
which the glacier forms and the mechan-
ics of glacier formation and motion. With
the requirement that the wintertime snow-
fall does not melt, the total accumulation
for that year is added to the glacier surface
(see Figure 4).  Here the simple principle
of uniformity applies whereby the under-
lying layer or strata from the previous
year’s precipitation is older than the one
above it. In this way the depositional
record is annually sequential and, depend-
ing primarily upon the rates of accumula-
tion and relative motion of the glacier, the
full length of a recovered ice core (i.e. the
depth of the ice) will represent the total
archived climate history for that particular
glacier or ice sheet. The longest time peri-
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Figure 2. A large ski-equipped transport plane lands on the cen-
tral Greenland ice sheet to resupply a remote drilling camp and to
extract recovered ice cores.
Figure 3. Drilling equipment and field supplies are
transported to the Dunde ice cap, China, by pack
horses and local herdsmen. Three days of travel
on horseback were required to arrive at the base
of the glacier. The ice cores were also carried out
by pack horses and eventually returned to the
United States for analysis.
PHOTO: KEITH MOUNTAIN
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ods preserved in ice cores, as is to be expect-
ed, are to be found in the great depths of the
Greenland and Antarctic ice cores. In 1998,
a collaboration between the French and the
United States, resulted in a borehole suc-
cessfully drilled to the glacier base, a depth
of 3,623 meters (2.5 miles) at Vostok Station
on the East Antarctic Plateau. The length of
the climate record, including a record of
atmospheric CO2 concentrations, has been
set at 400,000 years (Bowen, 2005; Jouzel et
al, 1987). The longest recovered climate
record from the Greenland Ice Sheet is dated
to approximately 120,000 years and was
recovered from the central regions of the ice
sheet in 1992 and 1993 at two drill sites only
17 miles apart. Each core measured just over
3,000 meters in length (Alley; 2000; Steig
and Alley, 2002).
Recently attention has been focused on
low latitude and tropical glaciers. Initially it
was considered that tropical glaciers did not
(or could not) preserve the details of the cli-
mate as effectively as their polar counter-
parts. The warmer tropical temperatures
potentially resulted in melting at the surface
and with percolation of meltwater into the
interior of the glacier the essential strati-
graphic signal would be destroyed. Also, as
most tropical or low latitude glaciers are rel-
atively small and often shallow, it was con-
sidered that, even if a record was preserved
it would not provide a time line necessary
for useful comparison to other glaciers.
Logistics introduced another complication.
The remote geographic locations coupled
with the high elevations required for tropical
glaciers to form made them unattractive for
attempted ice core recovery, particularly in
light of the heavy and cumbersome drilling
equipment available at the time. However,
the discovery and investigation of the
Quelccaya ice cap Cordillera Vilcannota,
Peru (13.9?S;50.83?W) provided the first indications that cli-
mate records were indeed preserved in tropical ice. In 1983,
following three years of preliminary testing and along with the
development and application of a solar-powered lightweight
drill, a core was recovered from the 18,600 foot summit and
was the first high resolution climate record containing almost
1600 years of climate history for this region of South America
(Thompson et al,1985; 1986 and refer to Bowen, 2005;48-74).
The implications of the published results settled the debate as
to the utility and reliability of tropical ice core records and
paved the way for continued glaciological research in Peru,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Africa, China and Tibet and provided a
detailed history of climate and climate change for these regions
on time scales not thought possible. Table 1 provides an abbre-
viated listing of mid-latitude and tropical glaciers from which
climate records have been recovered.
Conclusions and Considerations
Variation and change has and con-
tinues to characterize the Earth’s climate.
These changes have taken place over a wide
range of space and time scales, have shaped
the physical structure of the Earth’s surface,
and have altered the distribution and diver-
sity of the planetary biosphere. These
changes continue today and will certainly
continue for time to come. There are natural
forcing mechanisms behind climate change
as is evident in the waxing and waning of
the major ice sheets over the Pleistocene
and the advent of relatively short intervals
of global warming (interglacials). Today,
however, there is a clear need to factor in
the role of human occupancy as an influen-
tial determinant in the physical condition of
the Earth’s atmosphere and to come to some
understanding as to the possible conse-
quences of these additional inputs into the
climate system. Given the recognized com-
plexities of the climate system in terms of
linkages, feedbacks, magnitude of changes,
response times, and the geographic distribu-
tion of such change, it is essential that we
develop a constructive, interpretable work-
ing knowledge base related to climate and
environmental change. It is, however,
unreasonable to dismiss the consequences
of human population growth and the associ-
ated environmental adjustments required to
sustain this growth as having no impact on
the global climate. The Earth’s population is
increasing exponentially demanding equal
growth in the availability of critical
resources (energy, food, water) and necessi-
tating physical changes be made on the sur-
face of the earth (urbanization, expansion of
agricultural land). Along with human modi-
fication to the Earth’s surface and the meas-
ured changes in the composition of the
atmosphere since the turn of last century, it
becomes difficult to dismiss the human imprint on climate
change. Such reasoning also implies that the signature of
human climate change is not simply reduced to fossil fuel con-
sumption and atmospheric CO2 concentrations. This is merely
one of the more direct indications of an anthropogenic forcing
of the climate system. 
The evidence as to climate change and its global impact
has been greatly advanced over the past 20-30 years from ice
core evidence. Glaciers, their direct connection to the global
climate system and as unique, high resolution repositories of
multiple climate signals, have expanded understanding of our
contemporary global climate and the physical structure of past
climates. Glaciers, ice cores and the many other methods for
climate reconstruction that add to our knowledge base and pro-
Figure 4. A sample ice core is removed
from the bottom of a recently opened
crevasse on the Quelccaya ice sheet,
Peru. Shallow core samples such as
these are often taken to ensure that a
climate signal is preserved in the gla-
cier before a deep drilling project is
undertaken. The dark bands on the
right wall of the ice are dirt bands that
develop during the summer months
(dry season). The amount of ice
between the dirt bands indicates the
amount of precipitation that has fallen
on the glacier over one year or during
the “wet” season 
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vide foundational information for decision making with respect
to the consequences of global climate change should be given
some priority. And for many tropical and mid-latitude glaciers
and ice sheets time is short. As the climate changes and moves
to an increasingly warm state, these glaciers are melting and
along with their disappearance, the rich climate records they
contain are also being lost. 
As the inevitable policies and strategies that will be
required to accommodate continuing climate change are con-
sidered and implemented, the outcome and the long-term con-
sequences of these decisions will become the hallmark of our
planetary stewardship. Therefore, the efforts, costs, time and
resources necessary to understand the mechanics of global cli-
mate and environmental change can only be seen as a wise
investment in our collective futures. 
Keith R. Mountain is an Associate Professor and Chair of the
Department of Geography and Geosciences. He holds a Ph.D.
from The Ohio State University where he continues his
research on climate and climate change with the Byrd Polar
Research Center.  
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Abstract
Existing glaciers in the tropics and
mid-latitudes are in a state of recession,
widely regarded as a response to global
warming since the beginning of the 20th
Century. Glaciers on the summit of
Kilimanjaro have reduced in size as much
as 80% since 1912 largely in response to a
reduction of available moisture rather
than an overall increase in air tempera-
ture. Comparative surface energy balance
investigations on the summit of
Kilimanjaro indicate that the current
retreat of ice will continue. As the remain-
ing ice retreats, a surface type typical of a
high altitude desert remains which has an
energy balance structure that cannot sup-
port the presence of glacial ice.  
Introduction
Glaciers and ice masses form and
respond to the physical state of the over-
lying atmosphere and, as an integral part
of the hydrologic cycle, are considered to
be one of many obvious indicators of
shifts and transition in global climate.
Glaciers are dynamically responsive to
changes in the most basic of meteorologi-
cal quantities (notably temperature and
precipitation) but have a decided advan-
tage in that they effectively “filter” short-
lived variations and respond to the more
long-term, sustained shifts in the global
climate. In the simplest of relationships,
the physical state of a glacier system (as
with any system) can be expressed in
terms of basic energetic inputs and out-
puts. In the case of a glacial system, the
inputs (usually snowfall) are required to
be balanced against the system output or
mass loss (dominantly melting or subli-
mation). Here three possibilities exist.
First, with the input exceeding the output,
the glacier moves toward a state of
growth. Second, with outputs exceeding
inputs, melting or mass loss predominates
and the glacier will diminish both in vol-
ume and areal (spatial) extent. The third
(and least likely of the possibilities) is that
input is matched by the melting or the rate
of mass loss. In this latter case the glacier
will arrive at a condition of steady state
and be in balance with its climatic envi-
ronment. 
From observation, it is clear that gla-
ciers worldwide are in a general state of
retreat, and certainly this is true of all
mid-latitude and tropical glaciers. Of the
many intriguing questions related to gla-
ciers and the global climate is, if the cli-
mate were to either reverse direction from
its current state of warming or stabilize at
current levels, would the observed rate of
glacial retreat continue? This fundamental
question connects the permanence of ice
masses and their phase relationships to
shifts in climate both at the regional and
global scales. Since the early 20th
Century, almost all of the world’s glaciers
have been characterized by retreat, a
response largely attributed to the simulta-
neous increases in observed global atmos-
pheric temperatures (Houghton et al,
2001). With many of the world’s glaciers
serving as long-term and seasonal water
storage, their disappearance is consequen-
tial and in many cases has already become
a significant environmental concern (Cao,
1998; Mark and Seltzer, 2003; Bryan et
al, 2005; Bradley et al, 2006).
Kilimanjaro: The Setting
In February of 2000, an expedition
was undertaken to recover ice cores from
the remaining glaciers on the summit of
Mt. Kilimanjaro, East Africa (3.06˚S;
37.35˚E; elevation 5893m.). These gla-
ciers are the last of the glaciers in Africa
(other than remnant and stagnant ice
masses of Mt. Kenya and the Ruwenzori
Mountains, Uganda) and the only ice
masses on the African continent preserv-
ing a climate record for the region. In the
late 1880’s, the glaciers on Kilimanjaro
were expansive, but since this time have
been in a state of continual recession
(Hastenrath, 1984). This retreat has accel-
erated over the last part of the twentieth
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Figure 1.  View across the summit of Mt. Kilimanjaro towards the distant
Northern Ice Field indicating the typical structure of the existing glaciers and
the exposed volcanic surface. Energy balance measurements over the ice
surface were taken from a meteorological station established on the summit
of the Northern Ice Field. Measurements for the ground surface were record-
ed at a study site approximately one half a kilometer south of the North
Dome. Distance from the observation point to the summit of the Northern Ice
Field is approximately 3 kilometers (Photo: Keith Mountain).
glaciers had reduced in size by 80% since 1912 (Thompson, et
al, 2002, 590). This retreat continues today and recession based
on cartographic and climatological analyses suggest that by
2015 no ice will remain on the summit of Kilimanjaro
(Thompson, et al; 2002; Molg et al, 2003).
Energy Balance Studies
The intent of surface energy balance investigations is to
resolve the details of how the glacial ice (or any surface type)
interacts with the atmosphere directly above it. These are high
resolution analyses and factor in all components and processes
known to influence the character or response of surface to a set
of climatological inputs. In the case of glacial ice, the fluxes of
energy, how they are partitioned and their relative magnitudes
become a direct measure of energy available for melting.  
The initial input of energy to the surface of the Earth is
simply that of solar radiation. Energy that arrives at the edge of
the atmosphere above a point on the Earth’s surface depends
upon the site latitude, time of the year, and time of day, and this
extraterrestrial receipt of radiation can be calculated through
standard earth/sun orbital relationships (see, Oke, 1978).  It is
this supply of energy that passes down through the atmosphere
which, after some absorption and scattering, arrives at the sur-
face to serve as the primary driver for the resultant energy bal-
ance. At the surface, the general form of the energy balance
equation can be given as:
Eqn.1
where Q* is the surface net radiation, Qh and Qe the latent and
sensible heat fluxes respectively, Qg is the system heat storage,
and Qp the heat supplied through precipitation. Convention
dictates that fluxes directed toward the surface are positive;
fluxes directed away from the surface are negative. Essentially,
this is a statement of the conservation of energy in that equilib-
rium is reached when all the contributing fluxes are zero (i.e.
no net gain or net loss of energy). Typically the radiative flux-
es provide the greatest energy input to high elevation environ-
ments and the net radiation can be partitioned as:
Eqn 2.
where Ki is the incoming solar (shortwave) radiation; Kh the
reflected shortwave radiation, Li the incoming (atmospheric)
longwave radiation and Lh the emitted surface longwave radi-
ation. The sensible and latent heat fluxes can be expressed: 
Eqn.3.
Eqn.4.
where ρ is the density of air, Cp specific heat of air at constant
pressure, Lv the latent heat of vaporization, Kh the coefficient
of eddy conductivity and, Kw , the coefficient of eddy diffusiv-
ity for water vapor. The gradients of both temperature, T, and
vapor pressure, q, (moisture) are given with respect to height,
z, above the surface. With respect to the surface types for which
energy balance assessments were carried out over Kilimanjaro,
energy entering or leaving the system through storage was neg-
ligible as was input from precipitation. 
While the radiative fluxes (Q* and its components) can be
measured, the latent and sensible heat fluxes cannot.
Furthermore, as there is no utilitarian analytical solution to the
governing equations (Eqns. 3 qnd 4), many empirically-based
procedures have been proposed and find widespread applica-
tion in energy balance computations (e.g. Hay and Fitzharris,
1988; Brock, et al, 2000; Molg and Hardy, 2004) . 
The Measurement Program
The goal of the Kilimanjaro study was to simultaneously
measure the climatological components to complete a full sur-
face energy balance for two sites on the summit. For the ice or
glacier surface, the summit of the Northern Ice Field was
selected. For the ground surface, a site approximately one kilo-
meter south from the glacier station was established. In this
manner the two observation sites were close enough to be unaf-
fected by distance, but independently represent the surface
types characteristic of the summit (see Figure 1). Perhaps the
most notable characteristic of the surface types to be found on
Kilimanjaro is the immediate transition from the ice boundaries
to the underlying ground and the extraordinary vertical ice
walls, many as high as 50m. (Figure 2).
Each observation site was comprised of identical measure-
ment systems with data collection at exactly the same times and
integrated over the same time periods. Table 1 presents those
quantities measured and derived to complete the surface ener-
gy balance. Measurements were made over a 20 day period
beginning February 5th (Julian Day 36) to February 25th
(Julian Day 56) in 2000. For this analysis, only those days for
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Figure 2. The vertical ice walls typical of the remaining ice
masses on Kilimanjaro and the volcanic surface that is
continually exposed as the ice retreats.
PHOTO: KEITH MOUNTAIN
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which the skies were cloud free are con-
sidered, as they effectively represent those
times when the greatest amounts of ener-
gy are available for surface melting. 
Results
A principal characteristic of tropical
locations such as the summit of
Kilimanjaro is the receipt of high levels of
solar radiation. At the 6000 meter level
(19,500´), the atmospheric pressure is
approximately 480 millibars resulting in
more than one half of the Earth’s atmos-
phere below the glaciers of Kilimanjaro.
As such, the path length for a stream of
solar radiation through the atmosphere to
the summit is short, resulting in only a
minor loss of radiation due to absorption
and scattering by the mass of the atmos-
phere. The net effect is that, under the
condition of clear skies, approximately
90% of the solar radiation incident at the
edge of the atmosphere above
Kilimanjaro (3.06˚S latitude) can be
expected to arrive at the summit. In addi-
tion, for equatorial latitudes, the annual
receipt of solar radiation is unaffected by
seasonality. Averaged results for the short-
wave radiative fluxes as measured and
estimated on the summit of Kilimanjaro
are presented in Table 2. 
The incident shortwave radiation
over a given surface is modified by the
reflectivity of that surface and highly
reflective surfaces such as snow and ice
can reflect upwards of 70% of the incident
shortwave radiation. The resultant net
shortwave radiation, K*, represents the
available shortwave radiation for surface
processes and is related to the surface
reflectivity or albedo (α) as:
Eqn.5.
For Kilimanjaro the effect of the two
basic surface types upon the net short-
wave radiation balance is evident from the
computed albedos as presented in Table 2.
Over the observation period the average
albedo for the glacier surface was 0.65,
reducing the net input of solar radiation to
just under 13 megajoules per day. In con-
trast, the very low reflectivity of the
ground ensures large values of K*. For
this observation period a difference of
approximately 57% in the net shortwave
radiation was measured even though each
surface received similar amounts of
incoming shortwave radiation (Ki). 
The net radiation, Q*, represents the
total amount of radiative energy available
at the surface. For snow or ice surfaces, if
this flux is positive, energy can be used to
increase the surface temperature or, if the
surface is at 0˚C, produce melting. If the
net radiation is negative
(standard nighttime condi-
tions) the surface will
respond by lowering in
temperature or storing
energy through conduction
into the substrate. Table 3
presents a summary of the
integrated daily totals of
the primary radiative flux-
es for selected days of the
observation period for the
two surface types. 
Typical of the two surfaces on
Kilimanjaro under clear sky conditions
are the stability in the net radiation for the
ground surface and the systematic
increase in the net radiation over the gla-
cier with time. With constant exposure to
positive inputs of energy, the ice surfaces
typically transition from a smooth, often
snow covered surface to one of exposed
glacial ice. As a consequence, a positive
feedback is set in motion whereby the net
radiation increases proportionately pro-
viding increasing amounts of available
energy for continued surface transforma-
tion. 
On a daily basis, the surface net radi-
ation can be both positive and negative
(Eqn. 2). However, determining Q* as a
simple arithmetic outcome of flux direc-
tion can misrepresent the effectiveness of
the net radiation as a primary driver of the
overall surface energy balance. Figure 3
presents the trends in the surface net radi-
ation for both the glacier and ground sur-
face as measured on Julian Day 47 (Feb.
16th). Data are plotted with respect to the
extraterrestrial flux of energy, Kex. By
day over the ground surface, Q* is strong-
ly positive approaching 600 wm-2. In con-
trast, the glacier surface records a maxi-
mum positive Q* of approximately 220
wm-2. During the evening hours, driven by
the longwave fluxes, the net radiation is
negative at approx-
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Table 1. Measured and derived quantities required to complete the surface energy balance for the
two observation sites on the summit of Kilimanjaro. 
Table 2. Integrated daily totals of shortwave radiation, averaged albedo and atmospheric transmissivity
(T) for both surface types on the summit Kilimanjaro. Values are averaged for all days over the 20 day
observation period. All radiation estimates in megajoules per square meter. 
area under the
curves of Q* for val-
ues greater than zero
(see Figure 3), rep-
resent a true meas-
ure of the total radia-
tive energy available
at each surface. For
the most part, this
energy is used for
either daytime melt-
ing of the ice surface
or heating of the
ground. It is also
important to note that
both substrates have
little capacity to store
energy. The thermal
conductivity of the
ice is very low as is





ture that represents a




tative days over the
study period from
which it is critical to
note that for the ice
surface in particular,
the daytime esti-
mates of Q* are con-
siderably greater than those estimated as the
overall net flux as derived from Eqn.2.
Solutions to the sensible and latent heat
flux calculations (Eqns. 3 and 4) require input
of the gradients of wind, temperature and
moisture with height above the surface.
Although empirically-based estimation proce-
dures using measurements of these quantities
taken at only one height above the surface
have found widespread application, more
accurate estimates require reconstruction of
the non-linear profiles with height above the
surface. At both observation stations on Kilimanjaro, measure-
ments of wind speed, temperature and moisture were made at
the 0.5 and 1.5 meter levels above the surface. Surface temper-
atures, To, were also recorded. Table 4 presents daily averaged
temperature, wind speed and humidity as measured at the 1.5
meter level for both surface types. 
Averaged daily air temperatures over the summit of
Kilimanjaro are constantly negative with only slightly higher
temperatures recorded above the ground surface. Results are
summarized in Table 5. At no time over the observation period
did the air temperature over both sites rise above zero at either
the 0.5 or 1.5 meter levels. Wind is a constant feature with no
periods of calm conditions recorded. Highest wind speeds
approached 20 ms-1 and in general were slightly higher over
the more exposed summit of the Northern Ice Field. Humidity
levels as recorded at both sites are notable for their very low
values (and hence very low vapor pressures) and far more typ-
ical of a very dry, arid environment than that of a low latitude
glacial environment characterized by high energy inputs and
surface melting. 
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Table 3. Integrated daily totals of shortwave and net radiative fluxes and averaged daily albedos for
selected days over the observation period (Julian Day 44= Feb. 14th; Day 53 = Feb.22nd). All radiation
estimates are in megajoules per square meter.
Table 4. Daily totals of surface net radiation (Q*) for the glacier and ground surface partitioned into
energy gains (+) and losses (-) for each day. All values are in megajoules per square meter.
Table 5. Averaged daily values of air temperature, wind speed and relative humidity for selected days at
the 1.5 meter level above the surface.
Table 6. Relative humidity profiles for the glacier and the ground surface for
selected days. All values in %.
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Analyses of the surface energy bal-
ance over the summit of Kilimanjaro
reveal significant distinctions relative to
most other high elevation, low latitude
glacial systems. Here the persistently low
air temperatures in association with the
extremely dry air exert significant control
over both the magnitudes and directions
of the latent and sensible heat fluxes. The
vertical profiles of humidity as measured
over the two surfaces are presented in
Table 6. For each site the moisture charac-
teristics of the overlying air are reason-
ably similar at the 1.5 meter level indicat-
ing a uniformly dry air mass over the
summit of the mountain. However, at each
site the gradient of moisture is reversed
towards the surface. For the glacier,
assuming that the air in contact with the
surface is at saturation (relative humidity
of 100% and a vapor pressure of 6.11 mil-
libars at 0˚C), the overlying air increases
in moisture content toward the surface. In
terms of actual vapor pressure, this trans-
lates into a vapor pressure gradient such
that within the first 1.5 meters above the
surface an upward transition from approx-
imately 6.11 millibars to approximately
one (1) millibar can be expected. Thus, for
this surface, by virtue of this pressure dif-
ferential, moisture is efficiently directed
upward and away from the surface (i.e.
from high to low pressure). For the
ground site, while the daily air tempera-
tures do not rise above freezing, as a
response to high values of the net radia-
tion, the average daily surface tempera-
ture is typically 5˚C. Thus the moisture
content of the air near the surface is less
than that of the air above it, which at these
moisture levels, essentially removes any
influence of latent heat transfer on the
total energy balance for the ground sur-
face. 
Diurnal Trends in Components of the
Surface Energy Balance
While the average daily conditions
may be useful in identifying the longer-
term energy balance structure over
Kilimanjaro (e.g. Molg and Hardy, 2004),
such averaging can mask many of the crit-
ical energetic processes that take place on
an instantaneous basis. Figures 4 and 5
present the diurnal trends in air tempera-
ture and wind speeds at the 1.5 meter level
recorded at both sites on Julian Day 47.
Results for this day are representative for
all clear sky days included in this study.
The air temperatures indicate the degree
of thermal uniformity over the summit at
night with a divergence of several degrees
during the morning and afternoon hours
such that air temperature above the non-
glaciated surface is warmer than that over
the glacier. This is largely in response to
the extreme heating of the ground surface
during the daytime hours. The wind
speeds as recorded at the two stations are
essentially identical with speeds at both
sites similar in instantaneous magnitudes
and phase relationships. The most critical
divergence in the climatological structure
of these two surfaces is to be found in the
measured surface temperatures (Figure 6).
For the nighttime hours, both surfaces sta-
bilize at around -10˚C. At the onset of
sunrise, the ground surface temperature
rapidly moves towards positive values in
response to a low albedo and the poor heat
storage capacity typical of this surface
material. The glacier surface temperature
indicates a slight thermal lag following
sunrise. This forms largely in response to
an increase in surface reflectivity typical
of snow and ice surfaces at low sun angles
and the time required to raise the temper-
ature of the upper few centimeters of the
glacier surface to its maximum possible of
0˚C. 
The transfers of latent and sensible
heat over the surface of the glaciers on
Kilimanjaro result in a set of unique char-
acteristics relative to other melting gla-
ciers. The most notable is the absence of
any surface meltwater. Given the avail-
ability of a positive net radiative balance
during most of the day (Figure 3) and a
corresponding surface temperature at the
melting point (Figure 6), the presence of
surface meltwater is to be expected. The
nature of the surface temperature with
height above the glacier surface is also
atypical of melting glaciers. During sum-
mertime melting conditions, the air over-
lying mid-latitde and equatorial glaciers
can be expected to be greater than zero
degrees. In this case, as the surface tem-
perature of a melting glacier cannot
exceed 0˚C, the standard temperature pro-
file would be that of an inversion in which
case the sensible heat flux is directed
toward the surface adding to the total
amount of energy available for melting.
The primary forcing mechanism govern-
ing the latent and sensible heat fluxes over
the ice on Kilimanjaro can be derived
from inspection of Figure 7 and Figure 8
that detail the thermal structure of the
atmosphere between the surface and the
1.5 meter levels for both surface types.
For the ice surface, it is important to note
that throughout the day conditions of
lapse temperature profile dominate which,
with a temperature differential of 6˚C
within the first 1.5 meters above the sur-
face, is supportive of a general condition
Figure 3. Surface net radiation (Q*) for the glacier and ground surface as meas-
ured on Julian Day 47 (Feb.16th). Areas under the curves as indicated by the diag-
onal lines represent the total amount of radiation available for either surface melt-
ing or heating. Estimates of Q* are given with respect to the total available radia-
tion at the edge of the atmosphere for this day. 
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of free convection. This is conducive to a
transfer of sensible heat away from the
surface (negative flux) and is enhanced by
turbulent transfer due to the continual
winds over the surface (forced convec-
tion). With the upward directed vapor
pressure gradient between the surface and
the 1.5 meter level aided by both free and
forced convection, any moisture (water)
that develops on the glacier surface is
immediately moved upwards into the
overlying air as vapor. Even during the
nighttime hours, with low atmospheric
moisture and persistent winds, forced
convention supports surface sublimation.
For the glaciated surface on the summit of
Kilimanjaro, results indicate that the con-
tribution of sensible heat transfer to the
total energy balance is negligible (less
than one (1) megajoule per day), while the
latent heat transfer is as much as three to
four (3-4) megajoules per day. This repre-
sents a significant impact on the total sur-
face energy balance and is a notable
departure from the typical energy balance
of most melting glaciers (see for example
Wagnon et al, 1999; Hay and Fitzharris,
1988).
The surface energy budget of the
ground surface presents an equally
extreme set of climatic conditions. The
two primary climatic controls for this sur-
face are the low albedo and surface heat-
ing due to high levels of both net short-
wave (K*) and net radiation (Q*). With
Figure 4. Diurnal trends in air temperature at the 1.5 meter level above the glacier and ground surfaces
for Julian Day 47 (Feb.16th).
Figure 5. Diurnal trends in winds speeds at the 1.5 meter level above the glacier and the ground sur-
faces for Julian Day 47 (Feb. 16th).
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the air temperature at the 1.5 meter level
below zero and a surface temperature
approaching 40˚C, a condition of extreme
free convection is supported. In this
instance, sensible heat is efficiently
moved upwards and away from the sur-
face, and assisted by the turbulent wind
flow, increases the overall air temperature
(as measured at the 1.5 meter level) rela-
tive to that of the ice surface (Figure 4).
The other critical issue here is that with
the extremely dry air, persistent winds,
and the capacity to reach high surface
temperatures, any snowfall that takes
place over the ground surface is rapidly
evaporated leaving little opportunity for
the development of a permanent snow
pack on the summit.
Conclusions
As of the turn of the 20th Century, the
glaciers of Mt. Kilimanjaro, East Africa,
have been in a constant state of recession.
Measurements of the extent of ice cover
over the summit of Kilimanjaro in 1912
relative to those of the year 2000 indicate
that as much as 80% of the ice has disap-
peared. Results from long-term meteoro-
logical studies undertaken on the summit
indicate that the primary cause of this
recession is attributable more to a large
scale change in the supply of atmospheric
moisture over this region of East Africa
rather than directly related to the recog-
nized increase in average global tempera-
tures over this time (Nicholson and Yin,
2001). Surface energy balance analysis
supports this assessment. Results from
this study indicate that the rapid loss of
ice from the summit is attributable to the
high levels of available (net) radiation and
the loss of ice due to evaporation and sub-
limation. This is consistent with the
unusual physical appearance of the
remaining ice masses. The extensive ver-
tical walls, the immediate transition from
the volcanic surface to the ice boundary,
and the absence of surface or running
water typical of melting glaciers make
these residual ice masses unusual.
Perhaps one of the most unusual patterns
of this retreat is that the remaining ice
masses become fragmented creating
residual lobes of ice as seen in Figure 9.
With this pattern of retreat and the contin-
ual exposure of more ground surface
between these ice masses, the rate of
retreat and mass loss can be expected to
accelerate. Above all, it is clear that there
is little chance of a reversal of this current
state of retreat or even a decline in rate of
mass loss for these glaciers under the cur-
rent climatic conditions over the summit
of Kilimanjaro. This observed recession
and ongoing climatological analysis sup-
port the proposal of Thompson (2002)
that within the next decade (2015) no ice
will remain on the summit of Kilimanjaro. 
Figure 6. Diurnal trends in measured surface temperatures for
the glacier and ground surfaces on Julian Day 47 (Feb.16th). 
Figure 7. Temperature differences between the surface and the 1.5
meter level above the glacier surface for Julian Day 46 (Feb.16th).
Negative values indicate a lapse temperature profile (To>T1.5) . Positive
values indicate conditions of temperature inversion (To< T1.5). 
Figure 8. Temperature differences between the surface and the 1.5
meter level above the ground surface for Julian Day 46 (Feb.16th).
Negative values indicate a lapse temperature profile (To>T1.5) . Positive
values indicate conditions of temperature inversion (To< T1.5). 
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Figure 9.  A typical pattern of retreat for the
remaining glaciers on Kilimanjaro is the
separation of large ice masses into small-
er, disconnected fragments. The continual
exposure of the volcanic surface and its
associated energy balance will accelerate
the rate of melting supporting the predic-
tion that all glaciers on the mountain will
disappear within the next decade (Photo:
Keith Mountain).  
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On December 20, 2005, seven Northeastern states reached
an agreement to limit greenhouse gas emissions produced by
the region’s power plants. This historic effort, the first of its
kind in the United States, completes an effort initiated more
than two years earlier by New York Governor Pataki, who had
invited Governors in New England and the Middle Atlantic
States to participate in the development of a market-based cap-
and-trade system for carbon dioxide emissions. The govern-
ment caps the maximum amount of a pollutant a state can emit.
A state can trade its credits on the market based on the value of
the cap establishes.
The effort, known as RGGI [Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative], began in the fall of 2003 with the six New England
states, New York, New Jersey and Delaware as participants and
Maryland and Pennsylvania as observers. This region has a
long history of co-operation on environmental issues and par-
ticularly with emissions trading schemes. RGGI was therefore
a natural outgrowth of the region’s experience and success with
previous initiatives, such as the NOx budget program, limits to
gasoline vapor pressure and various measures to reduce precur-
sors to ground-level ozone.  The states were informed by the
clear, strong and compelling science that global warming is
already happening and that action is needed now to address it.
Further, the region recognizes that at its heart, global warming
is an economic development as well as an energy issue. 
The electric generating sector was selected first due to our
previous experience developing the NOx budget program
(NBP) and the relative precision of emissions data collected for
this sector. However, unlike the NBP, the signatory states antic-
ipate that the bulk of the reductions will not be achieved
through direct in-stack controls. Energy efficiency, clean ener-
gy resource development, distributed generation and combined
heat and power, limited fuel switching and replacement of
older sources with newer ones are among the options encour-
aged to meet the RGGI emissions targets.
The December 20th agreement represents a commitment
of seven states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and Vermont.
Massachusetts and Rhode Island have rejoined RGGI as of
January 2007, and Maryland is expected to fulfill its legisla-
tively authorized commitment to join RGGI by June 2007. The
nine state agreement (not including Maryland) covers over 600
net electric generating units, each with a size greater than 25
MW. (Electricity generating turbines are rated by the number of
megawatts they produce. A megawatt is a million watts of elec-
tricity). The RGGI cap was set at a level of about 150 million
tons of CO2, which is larger than that of Germany. The cap will
be fixed at this level for the period from 2009-2014, then
decline 10% by December 31, 2018. The cap is therefore delib-
erately modest in keeping with the recommendations to “slow,
stop and then decrease” greenhouse gas emissions. Several
recent technical and scientific publications, including that by
the National Commission on Energy Policy, emphasized the
certainty of the science, the long-term nature of global warm-
ing, the importance of taking actions now, the need for a
decades long commitment and the nature of generating assets
and the long useful life periods of power plants(40 to 60 years
is the normal life span of a power plant). 
During the MOU development period, eleven regional
meetings were held, often with over 125 attendees. These were
augmented by numerous conference calls and outreach and dis-
cussions at the individual state level. Participating groups
included individual generating companies, distribution compa-
nies, environmental groups and state environmental and utility
regulatory agencies. States had use of a broad and deep
resource panel that included representatives from the region’s
ISOs(Industrial Service Organization), consultants to the utili-
ty industry, groups with previous emissions trading experience,
brokerages and environmental and energy policy experts.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) provides the
RGGI description and implementation building blocks.
Following are descriptions of the main components:
• Model rule to provide guidance and consistency
among the states. It was released in March 2006
for a 60-day comment period; two stakeholder
meetings were held to provide for public input and
comment. The rule was revised to reflect com-
ments received and was released in mid-summer.
• Allowance auction. States have agreed to auction
at least 25% of their allowed caps for consumer
benefit or strategic energy purposes. These can
include: investments in energy efficiency and clean
energy, or to directly mitigate any potential
ratepayer impacts.
• Offsets and their protocols. The MOU currently
provides for companies to achieve thier required
reduction through other strategies such as
afforestation, landfill gas, end-use efficiency for
natural gas, propane and heating oil and methane
capture from farming operations to be used to sat-
Agreement Reached by Seven Northeastern States to
Address Global Warming:
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Inititiative
by Chris James
Manager, Climate Change and Energy Programs
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection
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isfy compliance obligations. Additional offset
mechanisms and protocols will be considered and
developed in the future. Initial offsets generated
within a RGGI signatory state will be valued at
1:1. i.e., the value of the offset is equal to the cred-
it awarded; those generated outside a RGGI state,
but still within the United States will be valued at
1:2 (50% discount).
• Price discovery and safety valves. The states real-
ize that carbon emissions trading is a nascent mar-
ket. To provide certainty and to reduce initial mar-
ket volatility, two mechanisms have been agreed
to: 
–  Offsets trigger: if the carbon market price
reaches $7 per ton for twelve months, three
events occur: offsets can be used for any quali-
fying project in North America; their value will
be 1:1 and the amount of offsets that can be
used for compliance increases.
–  Safety valve trigger: if the carbon market
price reaches $10 per ton for twelve months,
the compliance period may be extended for one
year. It also permits international offsets to be
used. This process can be repeated for up to
three one-year extensions if the market price
remains at or above $10 per ton. This has the
effect of freezing the cap or the rate of its
decline for that period.
• Modeling that was conducted for RGGI and in
some previous state level actions identified elec-
tricity imports and emissions leakage as a potential
issue of concern. The price differential between
various power pools may encourage wheeling of
electricity from the pool with the lower price to
that with higher prices. Leakage has also been
raised in the context of the NOx budget program.
The MOU charges a workgroup to investigate the
issue and to develop potential recommendations by
December 31, 2007, for future action. The work-
group will be weighted towards utility and energy
stakeholders, along with a resource panel.
• A regional organization is envisioned to serve as
the RGGI program administrator. Its role will be
advisory and administrative, and is expected to
focus on development of additional offset proto-
cols, emissions and allowance tracking of carbon
emissions, and helping to assure regional consis-
tency. 
• Additional RGGI states. Additional states are wel-
comed. The RGGI signatory states would discuss
the entry terms and conditions with any other state
that was interested in joining.
• Program review. Since this is the first such pro-
gram of its type in the US, and there is no Federal
driver at this time, states have agreed to formally
conduct a thorough review of the program’s suc-
cess and impacts during 2012, prior to the period
when emissions will decline. This will enable us to
complete any revisions recommended by the
review prior to 2015 and to recommend and adopt
longer-term reductions for the period after 2018.
Also, should there be a Federal program by then,
the effect and impacts of this would also be
reviewed.
RGGI represents continued regional leadership and co-
operation on environmental, economic and energy issues. Its
implementation complements the economy-wide measures
being considered and adopted in many US states, including
several outside the RGGI region. Increased energy efficiency,
development of clean energy and combined heat and power
projects will improve our energy security, reduce our addiction
to fossil fuel, stabilize electricity rates and help us to achieve
ancillary environmental benefits, such as decreased fine partic-
ulate and NOx emissions. For more information about RGGI
and to remain informed on future progress, please go to
www.rggi.org 
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U.S. states are often referred to as “laboratories of democ-
racy” for the innovative policy experiments they regularly
attempt in the service of delivering greater benefit to their citi-
zens at less cost. Successful experiments then replicate serially
in other states, until ultimately, new federal policy may be
implemented as a result. In this sense, states are certainly “lab-
oratories for what works in government.” A notable subset of
this dynamic, states are certainly “laboratories of environmen-
tal progress,” where the states have a long history of protecting
public health and the environment ahead of corresponding fed-
eral policies. In some cases, this relates to process characteris-
tics, like generating new ways to streamline environmental per-
mitting processes. But often, it reflects states’ recognition of,
and willingness to act upon, profound environmental problems.
In air quality alone, for instance, state actions to reduce acid
rain pollution, toxic emissions, mercury contamination, vehicle
emissions, and smog-forming nitrogen oxides all occurred
years before similar federal regulations. 
Global climate change represents the next chapter in this
book. The breadth and scale of global warming impacts –
including air quality, water quantity and quality, sea level rise,
habitat migration, heat waves, precipitation changes, health
vectors, biodiversity, etc. – makes it the “mother of all” envi-
ronmental concerns. And these concerns, if manifested in real-
ity, will impact state services and budgets significantly. 
There is now overwhelming consensus within the scientif-
ic community that anthropogenic emissions are the root cause
of increasing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas
(GHG), and that GHG concentrations are rapidly approaching
the level of dangerous interference to Earth’s natural climate
systems. GHG emissions are primarily due to the combustion
of fossil fuels to produce energy, which in the U.S. is done so
inefficiently that we waste more energy annually than Japan
uses. 
Accordingly, states divine not only environmental risk
from climate change, but economic opportunity as well –
through more efficient, less carbon-intensive production and
use of energy. Less waste, after all, ultimately means less cost
– particularly when appropriate “externalities” are taken into
account. 
States also understand the benefit of getting ahead of the
curve – not least the learning curve – when it comes to adjust-
ing their economies to new economic trends and realities. If a
carbon-constrained world is in our future, as now appears like-
ly, progressive states will seek to position their economies for
competitive advantage in that future. They recognize that deny-
ing reality is rarely a formula for long-term economic success.
State Climate Action Plans
Against this framework, several U.S. states have undertak-
en (or are currently undertaking) comprehensive climate policy
planning efforts.  Early documents called state climate plans
originally came on the scene in the mid-1990’s, typically after
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and
before or soon after the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997. These
“plans” however, were often simply lists of measures that could
be taken. They were rarely buttressed by state-specific techni-
cal analysis, evaluation of costs (or cost savings) and anticipat-
ed GHG reductions, or well defined implementation schemes.
Although drawing a specific chronological “bright line” is
necessarily arbitrary, around the year 2000 things started to
change. Approximately nine states developed climate action
plans after that date which included substantive analytical, cost,
benefit, and implementation elements. Not surprisingly, these
were the “usual suspects,” Northeast and Pacific coast states
with long traditions of environmental leadership.
Soon after, however, several states that haven’t been tradi-
tionally regarded as environmental leaders joined the club. The
Governors of Arizona and New Mexico launched comprehen-
sive, multi-sector, stakeholder-based climate action planning
processes in 2005, both of which were completed in 2006.
Similar efforts were launched in 2006 in Colorado, Montana,
North Carolina, and Vermont. These states were joined in 2007
by Illinois, Minnesota, and South Carolina, along with new
efforts in New Jersey and Washington. Most of these state
efforts have been assisted by the Center for Climate Strategies
(CCS), a non-profit consulting organization whose practice is
specifically tailored to bringing structure, facilitation, and tech-
nical analysis to state climate action planning efforts.1




Given states’ twin interests in eco-
nomic well-being and environmental
quality, the early results are quite encour-
aging. The GHG reduction policies select-
ed by stakeholders, analyzed by CCS, and
ultimately recommended to the Governor
as Arizona’s Climate Change Action Plan
indicate that concerted climate action
could reduce GHG emissions markedly
while simultaneously producing substan-
tial economic benefit over “business-as-
usual” (BAU). Specifically, Arizona
stakeholders made 49 recommendations
to the Governor – 45 of them with unani-
mous stakeholder consent – covering
energy supply; residential, commercial,
and industrial energy demand; transporta-
tion and land use; agriculture, forestry,
and waste management; and certain
“cross-cutting” issues (e.g., public educa-
tion and outreach). Policy recommenda-
tions included enhanced appliance effi-
ciency standards and building codes, an
escalating environmental portfolio stan-
dard, electricity pricing changes,
increased efficiency and demand-side
management, cleaner cars, an alternative
fuel standard, transit-oriented develop-
ment, increased reforestation, and reduced
land conversion, and increased water use
efficiency, among others.2
Arizona is the fastest-growing state
in the union, and its GHG emissions are
forecast to increase 149% by 2020 com-
pared to 1990. By implementing the full
suite of stakeholders’ recommendations,
however, it could cut statewide GHG
emissions back to 2000 levels by 2020
instead. As penetration increased with
time, the same policies could reduce GHG
emissions an additional 50% by 2040.
Conventional wisdom in the U.S. has
held that implementing climate actions
such as the Arizona plan’s recommenda-
tions would impose large additional costs
on its economy, and indeed, analysis of
several of the recommendations showed
positive net present value (NPV) costs.
Many other recommendations carried
such large negative NPV costs (i.e., sav-
ings) that, implemented as a package,
Arizona’s Climate Change Action Plan
would produce $5.5 billion in NPV sav-
ings from 2007-2020 over “business as
usual.” Further economic analysis indicat-
ed that approximately 285,000 new jobs
would be created in Arizona as well.
Cumulative GHG emission reductions –
in million metric tons of carbon dioxide
equivalents (MMTCO2e) – would
approach one-half billion.
Aside from these quantitative out-
comes of the year-long Arizona Climate
Change Action Plan process, there were
notable less-quantitative results as well.
In particular, the 35 members of the stake-
holder group developed not only policy
consensus, but also relationships with
each other and better understanding of
each others’ concerns. This enhances the
likelihood of successful policy implemen-
tation. Where opposing advocates typical-
ly fight for win-lose-draw outcomes in
legislative or regulatory venues, Arizona’s
climate plan stakeholders already ham-
mered out their serious differences and
reached documented consensus on the
Plan’s specific, implementable policy rec-
ommendations.
While some plan recommendations
will require additional legislative authori-
zation, many can be adopted under exist-
ing statutory authority, and Arizona has
already commenced doing so. Following
her review of the Arizona Climate Change
Action Plan, on September 7, 2006
Governor Janet Napolitano issued
Executive Order 2006-13 ordering adop-
tion of the recommended clean car pro-
gram, biodiesel and fuel ethanol stan-
dards, new state vehicle purchasing
requirements, hybrid vehicle incentives,
and GHG reporting and registry pro-
grams. The Governor’s Executive Order
also established statewide GHG reduction
goals for Arizona consistent with what the
Plan demonstrated could be cost-effec-
tively achieved.
Arizona’s stakeholder-based climate
change policy planning experience, while
extraordinary, does not appear to be
unique. A similar CCS process in New
Mexico concluded in December 2006,
with stakeholders making 69 GHG-reduc-
ing policy recommendations (67 of them
unanimous) to Governor Bill Richardson.
A smaller state in terms of population and
economy, New Mexico’s plan would
“only” save approximately $2.1 billion
NPV from 2007-2020, while reducing
GHG emissions almost one-third again
below the target originally set by the
Governor.3 Preliminary results from North
Carolina suggest that its GHG emissions
in 2020 could be nearly halved over
“business-as-usual” with 53 GHG mitiga-
tion options that the state’s Climate
Action Plan Advisory Group (CAPAG) is
considering.
Recent Climate Developments
About 18 states have concluded or
have underway comprehensive, stake-
holder-based climate action planning ini-
tiatives. The wisdom of these states in
commencing timely climate efforts has
certainly been validated by recent events
– if it was ever in doubt. First, one of the
quickest and clearest results of the 2006
election was the elevation of climate
change to a national priority. Almost as
though Members of Congress recognized
overnight that the prior federal position
was an emperor without clothes,
Members from both parties clamored to
be named to committees of jurisdiction
(both standing and ad hoc) over the issue.
Given the array of profound economic
and quality of life benefits that concerted
climate action will bring to the nation –
far greater security (both national security
and energy security), an unleashing of
technology innovation and development
(especially concerning energy efficiency
technologies and practices), new jobs,
greater global competitiveness, better air
quality, improved public health, and oh
yes, a better, safer environment – it is not
surprising that politicians of all stripes are
now tussling to get a seat on the climate
bandwagon.
Second, a regular review of global
climate change conducted by thousands of
the world’s leading climate scientists
under the auspices of the UNFCCC’s
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) occurs roughly every five
years, and the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment
Report (AR4) “Climate Change 2007” is
being released in stages in 2007. The AR4
has prepared and drafted in three sections
(reflecting three “Working Groups”):
“The Physical Science Basis;” “Climate
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability;”
and “Mitigation of Climate Change.” A
fourth offering – “The Synthesis Report”
– will follow. The first two Working
Group reports were available as this arti-
cle was being prepared, and they show
conclusively that (1) climate change has
already begun to profoundly affect natural
ecosystems and biological processes; and
(2) the impacts of climate change will
Spring/Summer 200746
Spring/Summer 2007 47
have overwhelmingly (though not univer-
sally) negative consequences to humanity,
especially the world’s poorest popula-
tions. Adding to these concerns, the AR4
comprises only scientific findings avail-
able through 2005; more recent scientific
literature shows cause for even greater
concern in terms of exacerbated and
accelerating climate impacts. By the time
the AR4 synthesis report is released, it
may be difficult to conclude that tardy
jurisdictions have been acting adequately
in the public interest. 
Third, recent political and scientific
developments on climate change are but-
tressed by parallel developments in busi-
ness and the law. On April 2, 2007, the
U.S. Supreme Court not only denied
but effectively chastised the positions
taken by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) and the
Administration with respect to the reg-
ulation of greenhouse gases, as well as
states’ standing with respect to climate-
induced damage. The Court’s decision
in Massachusetts v. USEPA suggests
that USEPA can – and should – treat
greenhouse gases as pollutants for all
practical (i.e., regulatory) purposes. At
the same time, under the banner of the
U.S. Climate Action Partnership
(USCAP), an array of large, U.S. multi-
national corporations (including two
global oil companies) recently called on
the Federal government to adopt sub-
stantial, mandatory limits on green-
house gas emissions – specifically, a 60-
80% cut by 2050 in order to keep atmos-
pheric GHG concentrations in the 450-
550 parts per million CO2e range. This
illustrates that debate within the nation’s
business community has moved from
whether any mandatory emission reduc-
tion requirements should be adopted to
specifically how such requirements
should be designed to maximize individ-
ual firms’ competitive advantage.  This is
hardly surprising in light of the fact that
early participants in the first phase of the
European Union’s Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) generally profited
from their pro-active involvement in
designing this GHG emission reduction
program. Although EU ETS allowance
prices have experienced ups and downs as
an unsurprising function of supply and
demand, overall the market for carbon
dioxide credits under the EU ETS has
grown exponentially – to ~$20 billion,
and we’re still in the first, pilot phase of
the program. A reasonably robust U.S.
carbon market could easily double in size. 
States’ Motives
The leadership states’ interest in cli-
mate action, of course, mirrors that of the
USCAP businesses; it reflects both
“offensive” and “defensive” motivations.
Defensively, leadership states are increas-
ingly aware that the likely effects of glob-
al climate change – including water sup-
ply disruption; agricultural crop yield
changes and forest productivity shifts;
water and air quality degradation; tourism
and infrastructure impacts; and weather-
related stresses to human health, among
others – could significantly impact their
economy, level of public expenditures,
and quality of life. Leadership states are
also aware, of course, that a number of
climate proposals have been introduced in
Congress – and more are likely to follow
– which may or may not adequately
reflect their best interests, credit their best
opportunities for mitigating greenhouse
gases, or provide appropriate aid for mar-
ket transitions or climate adaptation.
Leadership states know that engaging
early and concretely in climate actions
may give them a leg up in guiding future
federal climate policy outcomes. 
Offensively, leadership states recog-
nize that actions which reduce emissions
of greenhouse gases – including boosting
energy efficiency, developing renewable
and low-emission energy sources, captur-
ing and using currently wasted energy
(i.e., “recycling waste energy”), conserv-
ing natural resources, improving industri-
al processes, sequestering carbon through
agriculture and forestry practices, and
improving transportation and land use
policies – can enhance energy security,
keep more of citizens’ energy dollars at
home, spur greater resource productivity,
provide direct cost savings, improve air
quality and public health, and enhance
economic development, job creation, and
quality of life. Leadership states similarly
recognize that many such actions can be
implemented through market-based poli-
cies and other economically sound means,
and can advance their position in the
development and application of new
efficient technologies, boost their partic-
ipation in global markets, and
enhance their competitive
advantage.
By ramping up the learning curve,
gaining familiarity with climate change
issues and what options are available to
address them, leadership states put
themselves in a better position to influ-
ence future federal climate policies to
their advantage. Bob Gough of Native
Energy captured states’ fears of these
outcomes quite succinctly in a 2005
presentation, “If you’re not at the table,
you’re on the menu.” Jurisdictions that
have been recalcitrant to date on climate
action may be increasingly aware that
they’re “on the menu.” Against this risk,
it is little wonder that numerous states –
and groups of states – across the country
have adopted emission reduction goals for
GHGs. Several state and regional goals
are shown in Table 1.
A Model for National Action
It is evident that advocates of contin-
ued climate inaction or delay now lie well
outside the mainstream of American polit-
ical, business, legal, or economic consen-
sus. But exactly where the American cli-
mate consensus will go from here – or
how it may become manifest in statute
and/or regulation – is not yet clear. 
Consistent with the states’ history of
breaking new environmental ground in
other arenas, the climate action plans
developed by the leadership states are up
to the task at hand. Leading climate scien-
tists indicate that GHG reductions on the
It is evident that advocates
of continued climate
inaction or delay now lie
well outside the
mainstream of American
political, business, legal, or
economic consensus. But
exactly where the American
climate consensus will go
from here – or how it may
become manifest in statute
and/or regulation – is not
yet clear.
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magnitude of 75-80% are necessary by
2050 in order to limit global surface tem-
perature rise to 2 degrees Centigrade – our
current best understanding of the thresh-
old to avoid dangerous anthropogenic
interference in the Earth’s climate system.
A few bills have been introduced in
Congress which reflect this scientific
necessity, but most are significantly weak-
er. Typically, the more aggressive bills
have been viewed as impossible, imprac-
tical, or simply an “opening position” sub-
ject to political compromise. 
Early climate action plans from the
leadership states, however, demonstrate
that on a proportional basis, aggressive
greenhouse gas emission reductions of the
magnitude called for by the scientific
community are actually attainable – at a
net economic savings. Further, these plans
are grounded in effective implementation
of existing technologies and policies; their
success does not hinge on prospective
technological breakthroughs or unidenti-
fied silver bullets. Instead, they reflect the
“silver buckshot” of many proven, but
underutilized, opportunities already avail-
able to us, like those identified in the
Arizona plan (e.g., low-emission vehicles,
appliance efficiency standards, building
codes, electricity pricing and demand-side
management policies, distributed genera-
tion, combined heat and power and waste
energy recovery, renewable portfolio stan-
dards, reduced land conversion and
increased reforestation, etc.). Figure 1
illustrates the magnitude of early leader-
ship states’ climate action plans, scaled up
to the national level for comparison to








Arizona 149% 2000 levels by 2020; 50% below by 2040 106%
California 41% - Executive Order: 2000 level by 2010; 10%
below by 2020; 80% by 2050
- AB-32: 1990 levels by 2020
100%









Maine 34% 1990 level by 2010; 10% below by 2020; 75%
by 2050
100%
North Carolina 113% Not available TBD
NEG/ECP Not
available









New Mexico 48-64% 2000 level by 2012; 10% below by 2020; 75%
by 2050
133%
New York 24% 5% below 1990 by 2010 Not
available
Oregon 38% 1990 level by 2010; 10% below by 2020; 75%
by 2100
85%
Puget Sound 37% 1990 level by 2010; 10% below by 2020; 75%
by 2100
100%
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Table 1.  State and Regional GHG Emissions Growth Forecast, Goals, and Coverage of Goals by
Climate Action Plans, April 2007
Spring/Summer 2007 49
Preliminary, “back of the envelope”
extrapolation of the economic outcomes
of early leadership states’ climate action
plans is also encouraging. Although far
more data must be assembled, and greater
analytical rigor applied, there is little rea-
son at this point to suspect that the cate-
gories of climate policy options identified
by leadership state stakeholders and rec-
ommended to their Governors are not
generally scalable to the national level.
Based on the limited sample of early lead-
ership states’ climate action plans com-
pleted to date, Table 2 identifies these cat-
egories of options, their approximate con-
tribution in reducing GHG emissions
from 2020 BAU levels down to approxi-
mately 1990 levels, and approximate
costs or savings per MTCO2e reduced.
If these results are similarly extrapo-
lated to the national scale, U.S. GHG
emissions could plausibly be reduced
by more than one-quarter by 2020, at a
net present value savings of over $100
billion. As noted, these figures are very
preliminary, and based on a very limit-
ed data set of leadership states’ results.
It is possible that a properly rigorous
assessment would show this savings
figure to be off by an order of magni-
tude. However, in the past, initial esti-
mates of costs have typically proven to
be far too conservative, compared to
reality as it actually evolved (e.g., even
USEPA’s cost estimates for Phase 1
sulfur dioxide reductions under the fed-
eral Acid Rain Program were high by a
factor of approximately eight).
Accordingly, the 2007-2020 NPV of
aggressive climate action at the national
scale may be more likely to approach sav-
ings of several hundred billion dollars
than to be as low as savings in the realm
of “only” ten billion dollars. 
Conclusion
As the above discussion shows, states
are more than just “laboratories;” they are
full-fledged policy proving grounds. The
policy innovations emanating from their
“laboratories” are piloted, yes, but then
they are forged into successful policies
through the heat of conflict resolution,
political negotiation, compromise, con-
sensus, adoption, implementation, and in
some cases, enforcement. 
Effectively, policy adoption at the
federal level echoes – albeit in macro-
cosm form – all of the trials and tribula-
tions that policy adoption at the state level
requires. Federal policymaking may be
encumbered by the sheer magnitude of
national applicability and an even greater
plethora of competing interests than the
states typically face, but federal policy-
making enjoys one significant advantage
– the path forward has been broken by one
or more states. In short, state environmen-
tal efforts are often unprecedented in the
U.S., whereas federal environmental
efforts rarely are. Table 3 illustrates states’
pathbreaking activities with respect to air
quality concerns, an arena that has sub-
stantial overlap with climate action in
terms of sources, emissions, and solu-
tions. It shows that many, if not most,
major air quality initiatives over the last
Category of Action Preliminary Contribution to
Reducing GHG Emissions from




Energy Efficiency and Conservation ~24% -$10 to -$30
Clean and Renewable Energy ~24-30% $7 to $21
Transportation and
Land Use Efficiency
~20-36% -$32 to -$36
Agriculture and
Forestry Conservation




Table 2.  Preliminary GHG Reduction Potentials and Costs by Sector Based on Early
Leadership States’ Climate Action Plans.
SOURCE:  CENTER FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES
US GHG Emissions Under Various Bills/Scenarios, 1990-2050
































Figure 1.  Approximation of Leadership States’ Planned Reductions Compared to
Proposed National Legislation
State Policy State Adoption Federal Adoption
Acid Rain Laws (SO2) 1985 1990
(Federal Acid Rain Program)
Air Toxics Laws 1987 1990
NOx Trading (OTC) 1995 2004
(NOx SIP Call)
Mercury Emission Reductions from Power Plants 1998-2002 2005
(Federal CAMR Rule)
Renewable Portfolio Standard 1997-2007 Introduced
“Four-Pollutant” Laws for Power Plants 1997-2002 Introduced
Multi-Sector GHG Reduction Laws 2003-2006 Introduced
(McCain-Lieberman, Carper)
Vehicle GHG Emission Standards 2002 ?
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20-25 years have been pioneered by states
well in advance of federal adoption. In
several cases, such as renewable portfolio
standards, GHG emissions standards from
motor vehicles, and broader GHG emis-
sions reduction requirements, the states
are still waiting for parallel policy action
from the federal government.
Although states have worked togeth-
er to some degree in the past to engineer
regional agreements and commitments,
climate change concerns have accelerated
multi-state collaboration markedly. No
doubt this is in large part due to the states’
recognition that climate change is a glob-
al problem; climate actions by any indi-
vidual state are likely to matter little in
terms of absolute global emissions
changes. Regionally, however, multi-state
collaborations readily equate to the high-
est-emitting nations in the world.
Regional efforts also pool states’ expert-
ise, which is particularly crucial from a
resource standpoint in the absence of
technical assistance normally available
from the federal government. Leadership
states’ successes belie opponents’ predic-
tions of economic disaster, contradict sug-
gestions of public political retribution,
provide model policies for adoption by
other states, and build collective critical
mass toward comprehensive federal
action.
In short, given states’ history of suc-
cessfully paving the way for federal envi-
ronmental progress, it seems prudent to
anticipate that climate action will be no
exception. The fact that states are engag-
ing with each other to an unprecedented
degree to achieve – and demand –
progress on climate change reinforces this
expectation. So does the political reward
enjoyed by many pro-active governors for
their insistence on tackling climate
change. Faced with the twin challenges of
the most daunting, all-encompassing
environmental problem of all time cou-
pled with a virtual absence of constructive
federal involvement or assistance, it
might seem reasonable for states to wait
this one out. Instead, leadership states are
epitomizing responsibility in their efforts
to avert a global “tragedy of the com-
mons,” and in doing so, are finding sav-
ings, innovation, competitiveness, public
appreciation, and corresponding econom-
ic and quality of life gains. History may
remember leadership on climate change
action as the states’ finest hour.
References
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It has been two years since the commu-
nity of nations took the first, important step
to address the biggest threat facing our plan-
et -- global warming. I remember very well
the day the Kyoto Protocol took affect in 141
countries around the world, but not ours. 
In Seattle that winter, the warnings
about the distant threat of climate change
became all too real. The mountain snowfall
that we rely on for clean drinking water and
hydroelectric power literally didn’t fall. We
faced an uncertain year of water supply. I
was concerned for my city. I was worried
about the future. And I was mad that my
nation’s government was sitting on its hands. 
As Americans, we view ourselves as
part of a great nation, a principled people
with a history of rising to the challenge of the
most serious international threats. Yet here
we were, responsible for fully 25 percent of
the greenhouse gases causing a global melt-
down, but somehow incapable of doing any-
thing about it.
I was determined to show the world that
intelligent life had not been snuffed out in
America
So, I asked nine fellow mayors to join
with me in pledging to cut greenhouse gas
emissions in our cities and meet the goals of
the Kyoto Protocol. We also agreed to chal-
lenge other mayors from around the country
to do the same. We called it the U.S. Mayor’s
Climate Protection Agreement. 
Our initial goal was to get a symbolic
141 cities to join. Today, I am proud to say
that 432 mayors have signed our climate
commitment. They represent more than 61
million people in cities from every state in
the nation. They are Republicans, Democrats
and Independents.
They are leaders of
some of our biggest
cities and some of
our smallest towns. 
And they are
united in the know-
ledge that cities are the frontlines of the war
on climate change, where the risks are most
keenly felt and where the opportunities
springing from the clean-energy revolution
will be seized.
Population centers on rivers and in
coastal areas—from New York City and New
Orleans to St. Louis and Seattle—will bear
the brunt of increasingly severe weather,
flooding and rising sea levels associated with
climate disruption.
America’s hottest and driest cities—
places like Phoenix, Las Vegas, Los Angeles
and Houston—are becoming more vulnera-
ble to drought, water shortages and wildfires.
Some communities have even had to
move in Alaska, where rising winter temper-
atures have caused erosion, landslides and a
rapid melting of the permafrost.
Winter snow pack in Seattle’s nearby
Cascade Mountains is in some places half
what it was 50 years ago. It will suffer further
dramatic decline in the next 30 years if we
don’t act aggressively to cut emissions now.
The good news is that cities have long
been the incubators of great ideas. That
remains true today. In Seattle, we are already
seeing a growing green economy create jobs
and economic opportunities in fields such as
energy, construction and transportation.
Across the country, cities are trying new
approaches to reducing emissions. They have
focused on cleaner electricity production,
reducing energy consumption in buildings
and encouraging clean-burning cars and
transportation. If an idea works well, it can
be quickly adopted by other cities. If it fails,
others can avoid the mistake. 
We’ve had success in Seattle
Our publicly-owned electric utility, City
Light, is the first in the nation to achieve net-
zero greenhouse gas emissions, through a
combination of renewable energy sources
and carbon offsets—essentially paying oth-
ers to reduce their pollution. It’s a source of
great pride: we’re powering our city without
toasting the planet!
Most of our garbage trucks run on clean-
er biodiesel. Cruise ships based in Seattle
now plug into shore power rather than run
their massive engines when in port. And we
are investing heavily in mass transit systems.
More and more people are choosing to live in
the city and close to their jobs. And we are
making it easier to bike and walk in Seattle. 
We are now building a broad, action-ori-
ented public campaign to encourage energy
conservation in transportation, heating and
lighting. And the private sector is also joining
the effort by working to reduce their emis-
sions through the Seattle Climate
Partnership.
If Seattle were doing this work alone, it
would be a symbolic gesture. But the fact
that more than 400 other cities are working
together to reduce emissions means that we
are making a real difference for the future of
our planet. 
In January, more than 100 mayors joined
me in Washington, D.C., to make our voices
heard on the need for federal action. We
asked Congress to take meaningful steps to
protect the climate, and they have responded
with a series of strong proposals.
It was clear to me that the climate has
indeed changed in the nation’s capitol. As
mayors, we have accomplished much over
the past two years. And while we have a great
deal of work ahead, my mood has improved.
The frustration has turned into a sense of
hope that we have helped build a movement
that will result in this great nation joining—
even leading—the global battle for a stable
climate. 
A Climate of Hope: How American Cities





In the absence of significant federal action on climate
change, local communities and states are stepping up to the
plate. Local leaders in the Pacific Northwest have embraced
aggressive emission reduction goals, developed action plans
and adopted legislation. 
While climate change is a global problem, it will have pro-
found impacts on the state of Washington. Regional impacts
include loss of snow pack, rising sea levels, increased drought
and risk of forest fire.1,2 Less snow in the mountains means
reduced water supply for hydroelectric dams, irrigation and
habitat for fish like threatened and endangered species of
salmon. Sea level rise threatens coastal communities with shore
erosion, property loss and low-land flooding. Drier, warmer
summer weather accompanied by reduced runoff in spring and
summer will likely increase drought, crop threat and risk of for-
est fire. Hotter climate could also lead to more noxious pest
infestations of the region’s timberlands, as trees are often more
susceptible to pests and disease when stressed by heat and lack
of water. 
These predicted consequences combined with a sense of
responsibility have motivated state and local leaders to take
actions that will mitigate these impacts. The Puget Sound Clean
Air Agency was an early leader in organizing efforts at the local
and regional levels. This article describes some of the major
actions and leadership initiatives taking place in the state of
Washington for what will certainly be the predominant envi-
ronmental issue of this century.
Washington has much to lose from climate change and
therefore has been involved earlier than many other regions of
the country. For many decades the state has relied on cheap,
abundant and reliable hydro electricity that is inherently cli-
mate friendly as it takes little carbon to generate. Historically,
the Pacific Northwest has had abundant mountain snowfall that
acts as a reservoir for the rivers where dams and hydroelectric
generators have been built to produce electricity. Peak demand
for electricity in the northwest is in winter when rain and snow
historically have kept stream flows up and reservoirs adequate-
ly supplied. The snow accumulates above 3,000 feet in eleva-
tion and melts gradually through the spring and into the sum-
mer, storing the water and releasing it over many months. In
recent years, however, the growth in Washington’s urban areas
has caught up with hydro power supplies which, even with nor-
mal snowfalls, are a finite resource. Without significant addi-
tional conservation, new non-hydro sources of energy will
become necessary. The state and the Pacific Northwest are at a
choice point, where either new natural gas and coal power
plants will be needed, or the region can choose enhanced con-
servation and renewable energy resources like wind, solar or
thermal power.
The critical nature of making new choices regarding ener-
gy supply became starkly evident in the winter of 2004-2005.
Climate change had reduced peak snow pack in the Cascade
Mountains by as much as 50 percent from 1950s levels by the
mid-2000s. But in the winter of 2004-2005, the snow was not
falling even at the diminished levels already resulting from cli-
mate change. The reservoirs were nearly empty and crucial
snow pack was not building. At the same moment, California
was experiencing unprecedented energy shortages from a com-
bination of manipulation of energy supplies due to deregulation
and power plants being down for maintenance or other reasons.
In a normal winter, the northwest would be able to receive rel-
atively inexpensive power from California, as peak power
demand in California comes from air conditioning use in the
summer. But after the 2000-2001 brownouts, California was
Local Momentum Brings a Wave of Change –
Meeting the Threat of Global Climate Change Head-on
By Dennis J. McLerran
Executive Director
Puget Sound Clean Air Agency
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experiencing record energy prices as a
result of the market crisis that had been
created there. This resulted in peak power
costing more than 50 times what it nor-
mally would have. A power crisis in the
public and private utilities erupted quick-
ly in Washington state with large sur-
charges being imposed on ratepayers cou-
pled with major concerns about
brownouts or blackouts. Utilities scram-
bled to obtain emergency diesel genera-
tors and sought permission to use peaking
power plants beyond permit limits. Some
utilities began unprecedented borrowing
which resulted in rate increases that
would last for years into the future. The
governor of Washington issued emer-
gency orders addressing the crisis. The
bottom line was that this crisis made it
crystal clear to many local and regional
leaders that the changing climate could
have profound local impacts which need-
ed to be addressed. 
For Mayor Greg Nickels of Seattle,
who is now leading mayors from across
the United States with over 4353 cities
(including at least 15 from the Puget
Sound area) joining in a pact to meet
Kyoto targets with local emission reduc-
tion plans, this was, as he describes it, an
“aha” moment. Local leaders like Mayor
Nickels and King County Executive Ron
Sims, directed the Puget Sound Clean Air
Agency to develop a regional climate
change program to help identify what
steps could be taken at the regional and
local level to address changing climate. In
2004, the Puget Sound Clean Air Agency
formed a Climate Protection Advisory
Committee to begin to identify what steps
should be taken4. The charge given to the
group was to identify key local and state
options to address climate change which
might also have collateral air quality and
economic benefits. The group began by
looking to other state and regional plans
and strategies that had been developed in
New England, such as the Rhode Island
plan. Its priority recommendations,
released in December 20045, were to:
• Maximize energy efficiency
and increase renewable ener-
gy in the region's power mix
• Reduce the greenhouse gas
emissions of new vehicles
sold
• Reduce motor vehicle miles
traveled
• Protect natural landscapes and
forest biomass
• Increase recycling and com-
posting rates; reduce waste
• Develop and adopt a climate
change policy framework
• Promote public education and
citizen/corporate/government
action
• Encourage local government
to act
At the request of former Gov. Gary
Locke, the committee also offered recom-
mendations for statewide action to inform
the State of Washington’s participation in
the West Coast Governor’s Global
Warming Initiative, launched by the gov-
ernors in September 2003. 
The Puget Sound Clean Air Agency’s
Climate Protection Advisory Committee
process was a major stimulus for legisla-
tive action in Washington State. In the
2005 legislative session a number of
major climate change bills were success-
fully passed. Most significant was the pas-
sage of the Washington Clean Car Act
which adopted California emissions stan-
dards for cars in Washington, including
the greenhouse gas standards which
would reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from automobiles by up to 30 percent by
2017. This is particularly important in
Washington State where more than 50
percent of greenhouse gas emissions
come from transportation. This is in stark
contrast to most areas of the nation where
power generation from fossil fuels is the
major source of emissions. The 2005
Washington legislative session also result-
ed in successful legislation requiring
future public buildings (including
schools) to meet green building efficiency
requirements; commercial appliances not
regulated by federal standards to meet
energy efficiency requirements; and adop-
tion of significant solar energy incentives.
The 2006 legislative session resulted in
clean fuel mandates requiring 10 percent
of gasoline and diesel supplies to be from
renewable sources.
Since that time, local, regional and
national momentum around global cli-
mate protection has moved into high gear.
As mentioned earlier, Seattle Mayor
Nickels launched the U.S. Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement6 on
February 16, 2005, the day the Kyoto
Protocol took effect in the 141 countries
that ratified it. To meet the Kyoto goal
locally and to provide a “green-print” for
others to use elsewhere, the mayor
appointed the Green Ribbon Commission
on Climate Protection. The commission –
which includes 18 leaders from Seattle's
business, labor, non-profit, academic
communities and government, including
the Puget Sound Clean Air Agency – was
specifically charged with developing local
solutions to global climate disruption. The
commission issued its report and recom-
mendations to Mayor Nickels in March
20067, followed by the release of Seattle’s
Climate Action Plan in September 20068.
The plan offers a template for other local
governments in the country to meet the
commitments of the U.S. Mayors Climate
Protection Agreement. 
In October 2005, King County,
Washington hosted a Climate Change
Conference where over 650 partners
engaged a broad cross-section of
Washington State governments, business-
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es, tribes, farmers, non-profits, and the community-at-large in a
dialogue about climate change impacts and potential adapta-
tion9. The conference was significant as it was one of the first
in the nation to focus on the need for adaptation to climate
change.
King County Executive Sims, representing the most popu-
lous county in the state, then announced the King County
Climate Plan on February 7, 200710. He joined Washington
Gov. Christine Gregoire at the state capital later that day as she
announced the Washington Climate Change Challenge. The
governor’s executive order established greenhouse gas emis-
sions reduction and clean energy economy goals which, among
other things, strive by 2035 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
in the state of Washington to 25 percent below 1990 levels, a
reduction of 30 million metric tons below 2004; by 2020
increase the number of clean energy sector jobs to 25,000 from
the 8,400 jobs we had in 2004; and by 2020 reduce expendi-
tures by 20 percent on fuel imported into the state by develop-
ing Washington resources and supporting efficient energy use11. 
Work is already underway in the state’s legislature with the
2007 Clean Air/Clean Fuels bill which will, in part:
• Protect our children’s health by replacing dirty
diesel school buses with clean diesel buses to
reduce our kids’ exposure to toxic air pollution. 
• Require a 25-percent reduction in petroleum use
by state fleets by 2020, growing the market for
cleaner fuels and vehicles. 
• Reduce greenhouse gas emissions and clean up our
air by creating the infrastructure and incentives for
Washington State to produce and use biodiesel and
cellulosic ethanol.
In late February, 2007 came the agreement between the
five western governors from Washington, Oregon, California,
New Mexico and Arizona to develop a joint strategy to reduce
emissions and create a market-based trading system for climate
change emissions. The Western Regional Climate Initiative12
builds on the earlier efforts of the West Coast Governor’s
Global Warming Initiative and coincides with similar
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic state agreements.
Such momentum brings hope that both our region and our
nation are beginning to make headway against the global crisis
of climate change. In the Puget Sound region and in
Washington State, we are committed in the near-term to crest
the hill and begin reducing greenhouse gas emissions rather
than continuing to increase them. And by 2050 we know we
must reduce emissions by 70 percent or more to do our propor-
tionate share to stabilize the climate. As our agency’s Climate
Protection advisors pointed out just over two years ago, acting
now makes that journey easier and more effective and should
create opportunities for our communities to prosper by devel-
oping the technologies needed in a world transitioning to a low-
carbon economy. 
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Since shortly after we were able to
observe our planet from out in space in the
late 1960’s, there has been a growing
awareness and concern about our affects
on our global systems.
From the nascent focus on these con-
cerns in the 1970’s and 1980’s, by the early
1990’s national and international scientific
and governmental organizations were deep
into research and analysis on causes,
effects and appropriate policy responses.
Louisville’s evolution on the issue of
climate change has tracked these national
and international developments.
In 1992, the United Nations convened
what is sometimes referred to as the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro. This Summit
produced an International Convention on
Climate Change which the first President
Bush signed on behalf of the United States.
This convention acknowledged the signifi-
cance of global warming as an issue and
pledged national actions to begin to
address it.
In attendance at the Rio Summit was a
noted University of Louisville Professor of
Sociology, Dr. Lilyalyce Akers. Upon
returning to Kentucky she persuaded
Kentucky Governor Brereton Jones to con-
vene the first North American follow-up
conference to the Rio Summit. This
groundbreaking conference, called “From
Rio to the Capitols,” brought together
about 1500 participants from state and
local governments and nongovernmental
organizations from across the United
States in May 1993.
The conference sought to identify
opportunities, strategies and policies to
begin to address climate change and relat-
ed issues. The conference created enor-
mous energy and momentum in Louisville
to address an issue that was clearly of
increasing significance.
Building on that momentum, Dr.
Akers persuaded University of Louisville
President Donald Swain to use the 1993
Louisville conference as an organizing
principle around which to focus many of
the University’s programs and resources.
To this end, the University created the
Kentucky Institute for the Environment
and Sustainable Development. Over the
last decade, the Institute has played a key
role in researching environmental issues
and developing and implementing strate-
gies to address those issues, including cli-
mate change. 
The 1997 United Nation’s Climate
Change Convention in Kyoto, Japan
brought a heightened level of attention to
climate change. While the United States
was an active participant in the United
Nation’s process, it has yet to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol. However, enough coun-
tries have signed on to the agreement so
that in effect it obligates the signatory
countries to undertake significant green-
house gas emission reductions.
Even though the United States has not
acted to adopt the Kyoto Protocol, there
has been increasing activity in the United
States at the state and local level to begin
to address climate change.
In 1996 the National Association for
State and Local Government Air Pollution
Officials created a global warming com-
mittee to begin to better understand the
issue and to evaluate appropriate roles and
responses for air pollution agencies. In
January 1997, I was elected co-chair of
that committee. In that capacity I have had
the good fortune to attend several of the
United Nations Climate Change
Conventions (1997-Kyoto; 1998-Buenos
Aires; 1999-Bonn; 2000-The Hague;
2001-Bonn).
Additionally, the national group (now
called the National association of Clean
Air Agencies[NACAA]), in 1998, became
one of the first organizations in the United
States to publish a guide for local and state
Louisville Metro:
Addressing  Local Opportunities and
Obligations to Address Global Climate Change
Arthur L. Williams
Director, Louisville Metro Air Pollution Control District (1996-present)
Co-chair, National Association of Clean Air Agencies
Global Warming Committee (1997-present)
Art Williams presenting at Sixth
UN Conference in the Hague.
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governments which identified strategies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from all
sectors of the economy. (“Reducing
Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollution: A
Menu of Harmonized Options”).
This publication was followed in 2000
by the publication of a software tool, still
in wide use, that identifies strategies at the
city or state level and assists in quantifying
the greenhouse gas emission reduction
benefits from a particular strategy.
Against the backdrop of this interna-
tional and emerging national discussion,
the City of Louisville Board of Aldermen,
in September 1997, adopted Resolution
178, Series 1997 authorizing the City’s
participation in the Cities for Climate
Protection Campaign, part of the not-for-
profit organization the International
Council for Local Environmental
Initiatives(ICLEI). ICLEI provided a
$40,000 grant to the City of Louisville.
The City, through its participation in the
campaign, agreed to implement a local
internal energy efficiency project. The
project is designed to promote energy effi-
ciency in the private sector by attempting
to recruit twelve local industrial and man-
ufacturing companies to participate in a
climate change campaign for businesses
and to develop a local action plan to reduce
greenhouse emissions. 
While progress was being made by the
City on this initiative, by 2000 it was clear
that a broader effort in the community was
necessary and appropriate. To accomplish
this, the Louisville chapter of the Sierra
Club undertook an effort to seek the partic-
ipation of Jefferson County Government in
the ICLEI campaign. The Sierra Club
requested that the Jefferson County Air
Pollution Control District take the govern-
ment lead in this and with close collabora-
tion with the Sierra Club and a number of
other interested individuals and organiza-
tions, especially including several faith-
based groups, the Jefferson County Fiscal
Court, in 2002, authorized County partici-
pation in the ICLEI campaign.
Coincidentally, at this time, the merg-
er of City and County government became
a predominant governmental pursuit (local
voters having approved merger in the
November 2000 election to be effective
January 2003). 
While the ICLEI campaign helped get
the local City and County governments
energized and focused on beginning to
grapple with the issue of reducing green-
house gas emissions, the effort has kicked
into a much higher gear the last two years.
In 2004, Mayor Greg Nickles of
Seattle, Washington initiated what has
become one of the most important local
government initiatives to address climate
change. Within the framework of the US
Conference of Mayors(USCM), Mayor
Nickles launched the Climate Protection
Agreement to focus and commit local gov-
ernment efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. 
In April 2005, Louisville Metro
Mayor Jerry Abramson signed the City of
Louisville on to the Climate Protection
Agreement. As detailed elsewhere in this
issue of Sustain, the agreement seeks to
have participants pursue a wide range of
activities and strategies including estab-
lishing a baseline greenhouse gas emis-
sions inventory and to reduce such emis-
sions to levels suggested for the United
States by the Kyoto Protocol—that is, 7%
below 1990 levels by 2012.
One of the important features of the
US Conference of Mayor’s initiative,
which now has over 400 signatories, is that
the authorizing resolution recognizes and
promotes close cooperation
with ICLEI. Thus, Louisville
Metro’s efforts, begun within
the context of the ICLEI cam-
paign has now evolved and
merged with the Climate
Protection Agree-ment of the
USCM.
To further the City’s pursuit and
implementation of the agreement, the City
has now created a new climate change
committee of the Partnership for a Green
City. This partnership is a unique collabo-
ration between Louisville Metro govern-
ment, the University of Louisville and the
Jefferson County Public School system to
identify and implement progressive envi-
ronmental strategies across all three enti-
ties. (You can find more information
about the partnership at: http://www.
j e f f e r son .k12 .ky.u s /Depa r tm en t s /
E n v i r o n m e n t a l E d / G r e e n C i t y / ) .
This new climate change committee,
which began meeting in December 2006,
has a diverse representation from across
the three organizations, and appropriately
includes key staff with responsibility for
many energy use activities such as build-
ings and motor vehicle fleets. Also, the
group reflects expertise in numerous poli-
cy areas such as land use, transportation
and reforestation.
The committee is now in the process
of establishing subcommittees to accom-
plish its work. Among the subcommittees
under consideration are ones to address
education and outreach; energy efficiency
across all sectors, promoting renewable
energy; studying, adapting to and mitigat-
ing local climate change impacts; and eval-
uating opportunities for offsets, trading
and participating in greenhouse gas emis-
sion registries or exchanges. 
While the committee’s efforts are ini-
tially focused on the greenhouse gas emis-
sions of the three partners, in order to
achieve the broader goals of the agreement
it will be necessary and appropriate to link
to the broader community.
With the increasing momentum on cli-
mate change, reflected by the landmark US
Supreme Court decision on April 3, 2007,
the creation of the groundbreaking Climate
Registry, the numerous bipartisan bills
pending in Congress, and the updated sci-
ence reports out of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change which lend
increased concern to the probable dramat-
ic, if not catastrophic, effects of climate
change, Louisville is well-positioned to
take decisive action to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions.
Global Warming “Lifeboat” by Friends of the Earth
at COP 5 in Bonn, Germany (1999).
